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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
By the term leaeed territory is meant a territory ceded by
1 2
one state to another in usufruct or in bail for a certain per-
iod of time. Over such a territory the lessor during the pe-
riod of lease, abstains from exercising any right of adminis-
tration. However, on the expiration of the agreed term of lea-
se, the lessor is entitled to receive back all rights and pri-
vileges which have been delegated.
The device of lease did not originate in China. The idea of
applying to territorial transactions between states the concep-
tion drawn fron Roman Law of a separation between proprietor-
ship and beneficial enjoyment is not altogether new, though in
its elaborate form we do not find it till we come to compara-
tively recent times. In middle ages, it took its primitive
form of a pledge as when ,in 1294, Edward I of England allowed
Philip IV of France to hold Gascony by his garrisons, pending
3
a settlement of various disputes between the two monarchs. Again,
in 1803 we find a similar case in which Sweden undertook to give
the town of Wismar to the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg- Schwerin
1. Cobbet, Leading Cases on International Law, Part I, P. 110.
2. Perrinjaquet, Des Cessions Temporaraires de Territoiree,
P. 106.
3. Lawrence, Principles of International Law, P. 175.

2for the sum of 1,258,000 thalers, on the condition that Sweden,
after the lapse of 100 years, should be entitled to take back
1
the town on repayment of the money, with Z% interest per annum.
Such also are the leases of different parts of his mainland do-
minions which the Sultan of Zanzibar granted to the British East
African Company in 1888 and 1890 for 50 years, extended in 1891
3
to perpetuity. A similar instance is found in the Anglo—-Con-
golese agreement of 12 May, 1894 whereby, the sovereign of the
Congo State recognized the British sphere of influence as laid
down in the Anglo-German agreement of 1 July, 1890 and Great
Britain undertook to give that sovereign a lease of certain ter-
ritories carved out of that sphere, which during his reign would
3
include Fashoda but would afterwards be diminished in extent.
These examples illustrate the origin and development of the so-
called " lease w . But it is not until the application of the
principle in China that we find it employed in such a manner as
to render it conspicuous and important and worthy of special in-
vestigation.
In one year 1898, five territories with a total area of 2,250
4
square miles were leased to foreign nations; that is Kiaochow
,
5
leased to Germany, Port Arthur and Talienwan, to Russia, Weihai-
wei and Kowloon, to Great Britain, and Kwanchow Bay, to France.
1. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, P. 221.
2. Westlake, International Law, Part I, P. 135.
3. Ibid, Part I, P. 132, and P. 138. n A lease without any
rent due from the lessee and without limit of continuance is not
a true letting but an alienation." Quoted from the Revue Genera-
le de Droit Internationl Public.
4. Captured by Japan in 1914.
5. Transferred to Japan in 1905.

The methods of acquiring of these leases were n.oet high hand-
ed while the conditions under which these leases were made were
elaborate. It is here that we find the most highly developed
form of that particular type of international transaction.
All these five territories are China's front gates; all of
them are strategical point d'aepui; all of them are more or les
commercial centres; and all of them are the starting points of
of the creation of spheres of influence. Their importance to the
lessor is vital and absolute and the possession of them by other
powers is essentially detrimental and dangerous to the interest
of the mother state. What then are the relations between these
territories and the hinterland? How important are they as com-
mercial centre ? How important are they as naval bases ? How
is process of the creation of spheres of influence going on ?
What is the comparative importance of each of these territories?
What are the legal and actual effects of these leases upon the
sovereignty of China ? What action should the Chinese under-
take in regard to them ? These are the main questions which this
paper engages to discuss and answer.

CHAPTER II.
KIAO CHOW.
Kiaochow, the German leased territory in China, is situated
on the coast of Shangtung Province. It consists of 193 square
miles, exclusive of the bay of about 200 square miles, and of
a neutral zone of 2,500 square miles. The lease of this territo-
ry to Germany was sanctioned on M arch 6, 1893, and was governed
under German administration until the 6th of November, 1914,
when it fell into the hands of Japan, as a by-product of the
great European War.
Viewed from its geographical position, the influence of Kiao
Chow is second only to Kwantung. It is 390 miles from Shang-
hai, 270 miles from Welhaiwei, 5 34 miles from Tientsin and about
1
300 miles from Port Arthur. It takes 7 hours irom Hiao Chow to
enter the Gulf of Peichili; 25 hours to embark at Pciho in front
of Tientsin; 23 hours to reach Temulpo on the coast of Korea ; 30
hours to cross the Strait of Korea and to arrive at the medium
2
extremity of Japan. The importance of its geographical relation
1. China's Year Book, 1914, P. 5.
2. Cheradame, La Colonisation et les Colonies Allemandes, P.
129.

to the i.interland has led Von Richthofen, Germany's wandering
geographer, to urge tmphat ically that Shangtung is the ideal
province, and Kiao 6how Bay the ideal foothold in that province
1
for a German s here of influence. Geologically speak ng the
same author after describing the mineral resources of the pro-
vince, concluded that the power which possessed Kiao Chow would
2
control the coal supply in northern Chinese waters. As a point
d' appui^ men have long ranked it as a second Port Arthur. From
its rapid commercial growth, it leads people to be ieve that in
3
all probability it may become a second Sar Francisco. It is due
to these obvious and significant facts that Mr. Harding weightly
concludes, n In the beleaguered hills that surround Tsingtao there
4
is the key to unsuspected empire." With respect to the psycho-
logical factor, the lease of Kiao Chow is the ear marking of the
home province of the Chinese national sage, Confucius. Its occu-
pation marks the first enchroachment of foreign invasion on the
mainland; it is this event that leads to the socall d the year of
k
spoils of 1R98. It is no wonder that the mention of Kiao Chow and
territories
otner thrills the Chinese soul with indignation as the name of
Alsace Lorraine stirs the soul of the French.
Germany ' s Colonial Ambition as a Spur to its Acquis i tion
During the middle period of the 19th Century, colonial posses-
sion were undervalue : in Europe, especially in Germany. In hie
memoirs, Bismark declres that Germany, having achieved national
existence and power, now has no further, desire but the mainte-
nance of peace and of the status quo. So Germany remains inno-
1., 3., 4., Outlook, Nov. ,11,1914, P,579, P. 575.
2. Kolonialzeitung, Jan. 6,1393.

6cent in colonial aggression until the last two decades of the
19th Century when after unification, her economic and politi-
cal situation caused her inevitably to become a seeker for co-
1
lonies.
for this change in Germany's policy
One of the urgent cau ses ^is evidently found in overpopulation
and emigration. This is best understood in the words of Treichke,
A
the fervent advocate of a Greater Germany. He lamented in an
eloquent passage, that every year a quarter of a million Germans
emigrated from the new German Empire. Treichke desired that men
and women who could not find room in Germany, should still re-
main German subjects under German rule when they were abroad. He
which
said again that in a country had colonies to which emigrants
A
could go, the surplus energy reappeared in the Imperial balance
sheet on the credit side; therefore for a growing nation, it is
.3
better to have colonies.
too j
Then^the penetration of foreign products has inspired the
young patriots to set out for lands that produce such admirable
goods. Germany, yearly becoming more and more industrial and com-
al
mercial, is more than any other Occident country except Great
Britain dependent on foreign supplies of food and in a lesser de-
gree on foreign supplies of raw material. This particular aspect
of Germany's economic development therefore is also pushing her
becoming *
increasingly in the direction ofAa colonial power.
It is in these fundamental places that Germany first felt the
importance of colonial acquisition due to these conditions that
1, Reinsch, Colonial Gevernment, P. 10.
2, The Nineteenth Century, Nov. 1914, P. 959.
3, Colquhoun, The Mastery of the Pacific, P. 405.

7even Bismark was finally forced to change hie efforts and atti-
tude and in 1880 to ask the Reichstag to support private colo-
nization. The attitude of the whole empire has changed to such
an extent that the stone rejected by the builder has become the
head of the corner. The common cry ,f too late n hae been voiced
in all accents, from those of the reproachful complainer tc
those of the belligerent partisan and agitator. Owing to the
daring and decisive measures taken by Bismark, and to the enthu-
siastic efforts of private individuals and companies, Germar.y-
in 1884 was successful in acquiring six territories, namely To-
goland, South Africa, Kamerum, Kaiser Wilhelmland, Bismark Archi-
pelago, and German East Africa. But unoccupied land is limited
after that period, and all Germany' possessions are tropical ex-
cept South Africa which is subtropical. Can Germany be satisfied
with her "Imprisoned Empire " and these unavailable lands f The
realization of the Welt Pol itik must lie in the domination over
the temperate zone China, after her war with France and Great
Britain in 186C, , began to disclose her weakness while the war
with Japan in 1894, began to shake her foundations* Thu^o the
Germans China seemed to furnish one of the beet opportunities fcr
the realization of the German colonial ambition.
Balance_pf_ Power as_ a_ Cause .
The balance of power in the Far East has been another strong
factor that has set Germany to acquiring a foothold in China. Be-
fore the lease of Kiao Chow, it must be recognised that Germany
was the only nation among the ambitious powers, which had deci-
sive influence in the affaire. in China
.
Von Buelow, in a
speech given to the Reichstag, says, " It is indisputable that
H'l
8without a territorial poin t d'appui in Easter^ Asia we would be
simply floating in the air, from an economical, maritime and po-
litical point of view. We require an economic entrance- gate to
the Chinese market, as France has in -Tonking, England in Hong-
kong, and Russia in the North We are obliged to endeavor
to obtain similar concessions to those enjoyed by other powers.
Without a territorial possession, Germany's intellegence and
and the country's technical and commercial power would have been
wasted and used merely as manure for foreign fields without fruc-
tifying our own garden. A station for the fleet was consequently
1
an absolute necessity. n Kiao Chow, the Germans think, furnishes
the most effective and most advantageous means for pursuing this
end.
The Fear, of Partition of China as a Mo t iy
e
It is curious to notice that Germany wanted to get a foothold
in China because she was afraid that China would be partitioned,
the
In speaking toA Reichstag Chancellor Von Buelow says, w Mention
has been made of a partition of China. Such a partition will
not be brought about by us at any rate. All that we have to do
is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go emp-
ty handed. The traveller cannot decide when thetrain is to start
A
but he can be sure not to miss it when it does start. The devil
2
takes the hindmost. " Such a policy seems to be a far reaching
one, leadings perhaps t to partition but it becomes impossible when
1. The Japan Weekly Mail, March 26, 1898. A similar and more
detailed statement
,
made by von Brandt, is found in Forum, vol.
25, p. 257-66.
2. Reinsch, The World Politics, p. 164.
II
J
9we carefully examine the strength of the Chinese nationality
and the jealousy among the interested nations. Kiao Chow, how-
ever, to the Germans, seems to be the sure means which enables
her not to mise the train. In fact Germany has actively labor-
ed with this end in view.
Steps Taken to. Sei ze Kiao Chow Prior to Actual. Occupation^
The first account of Kiao Chow was made by von Richthofen, du-
ring his voyage to China in 1861. But no actual undertaking was
planned until 18S1 when the secret plan, as Mr. Andre Cheradame
1
points out, was entertained by the Germans in regard to Kiao Chow.
During the Chino- Japanese War in 1894, war vessels of several
nations were temporarily anchored here, so the superb position
1
of
6
A
port was familiar to every one, especially to the Germans and the
Russians. From this time on Germany's taste for Kiao Chow was
It.
intensified and her statesman worked hard toward its acqisition.
The active part which Germany took with Russia and France in the
retrocession of Liaotung Peninsula to China was, among other things.
with a view to exacting compensation, and that compensation in the
2
German mind was Kiao Chow. During the visit of Li Hung Chang to
Germany, the statesman was told that Germany was anxious to rent
or buy any place upon which the two powers might agree, and that
place, as understood, was Kiao Chow. The action of Germany to-
3
rard Kiao Chow was further haetenedby the Cassini Convention. In
1. R. of Rs., vol. 31, p. 737. Germany's design in the Far East,
2. At the time of the German seizure of Kiao Chow, the Berliner
Neueste Nachrichten asserted that after all Germany did not join
France and Russia in settling the differnces between China and Ja-
pan in order to strengthen French and Russian interests but rather
to promote her own.
3. Cordier, Histoire, vol. 3, p. 343-47.
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spite of doubt as to the authenticity of its contents, by article
9 Chinh. was said to agree that Russia might lease Kiao Chow for
15 years for the use of the squadron, but in order to avoid sus-
picion by other powers Russia should not immediately occupy the
harbor or seize the points commanding it. The Germans were impa-
tient at the exposure of this suspected convention. So, as "The
Guide to Tsingtao and its Neighborhood " tells us, in January 8,
1897 a German expert in harbor building and engineering was sent
out to China by the Berlin government in 1 response to Diedrichs'
demands and as his report was again favorable, the German govern-
ment made immediate overtures to the Chinese government regarding
a lease of Kiaochow Bay— overtures, which were, however, reject-
ed but not abandoned. With the colonial aspiration amcng thw Ger
-
mans on the one hand and Richthofen f s and others » exaltation of
Kiao Chow on the other, the only thing for the Germans to do in
realizing their dreams was to wait for an excuse which was only
a matter of time.
The German Occ upation of K iao Chow_.
And China presented the excuse on November 1, 1837 in the
death of two Roman Catholic priests, named iiiel and Ziegler, li-
vingin the Chu Yi district, Yenchowfu, in the province of Shang-
tung. On account of a long established hatted arising from the
fact that the priests in question were disposed to help the na-
tive adherents against non- Christians, were attacked by
a band of twenty ruffians, supposed to be members of the "Great
Sword Society ", who murdered them in cold blood. Ac? Mr, Douglas
and others point out,,n Thie outrage differed in kind from those
authorities
usually perpetrated on foreigners in that the local were well-dis-

11
poeed towards the prieste, and were in no sense pro&otere of the
1
crinje. 1 These extenuating circumstances were, however, entire-
ly ignored by the Germans who ssuspected the late provincial gc-
called by Mr. Putman Weale
vernor, Lee Pin-Hin of having instigated the action. Bishop Anzer, K
•axeman priest of the Church militant who would confound the earth-
ly wit^lieavenly to ser\e his government', . at once
flashed the news to von Heyking, the German minister, Von Hey-
king at once got into communication with Friedrichstrasse . There
was a day's interval, then back came the order that gave von Hey-
king his cue. For brusque opportunism in seizing a situation it
stands with the telegram of Elms. " Ask for the most exacting re-
2
paration" it ran, "and be satisfied with nothing." The Peking go-
vernment, on the other hand, promptly ordered a strict search for
the culorits, and in three weeks the local authorities succeeded
in arresting four of the guilty persons.
But within a few hours of the receipt of the news of the mur-
1. Douglas, Europe and the Far East, p. 318.
8. Harding, Outlook, Wed., Nov. 11, 1914, p. 579.
Mr. Reisch in his " World Politico "
, p. 33, scvs, " The
importance attributed to thi6 agency( Ro~an Catholics), by the
powers is well known by the struggle between France and Germany
for the right to protect the Roman Catholic Missionaries of the
Orient. France has been the traditional protector of Catholic c
Christians in the East. This monopoly it has been the constant
effort of Germany to break down by using all the influences which
the Emperor could bring to bear at the Vaticans. The Emperor has
asBerteu his right to the protectorate over certain German commu-
nities of missionaries. And we all know how a protectorate was
utilized in China, the Empe ^or demanding reparation for the murder
of missionaries at Kiao; Choy and makicg. the outrage a pretext for
gaining a permanent foothold in the Celestial Empire. His exer-
tions to gain from the VaticariTreligious protectorate in Palestine
and Syria have not been succeeful, but he has nevertheless declared
it to be his right and the pOlicy of the German Empire to protect
German missionaries tosrever found? It would, however, be unjust
to say that- Germany is the only nation which utilizes missionaries
as a means for material benefit. The fact that " the flag follows
missions and trade follows the flag n has been worked out more or
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dere,the German squadron commanded by von Diedricha, comprising
the Kaiser, Princess Wilhelm, and Commorant sailed fror ^osung
on the 11th of November and reaced Kiao Chow on the 14th. Von
Diedricha sent a message to inform Chang Kao-Yuan, then General
in Command of the Bay of Kiao Chow, saying that he intended land-
ing a strong party of men and occupying the forts. The general
retired on receiving a decree from Peking, and 600 German marines
landed at the barracks of the f©rt.
The action which the Germans took was entirely contrary to in-
been
ternational law. It did not appear to have preceded by any inter-
the
change of communications with Peking government, such as the cus-
tom of nations had hitherto prescribed. The dispatch of men of
war in time of peace to make a descent upon the shores of a friend-
ly power and seize a slice of its territory, was an act that does
not fall within ?£e prange of the doingsjDf civilized states in the
19th Century. There was not the slightest doubt of Germany* e lend-
ing herself to such performances.
1
After landing, on the same day, a proclamation was issued to
the effect that, while Germany was in friendly relations with China
2
and had no designs on the Chinese territory, she intedded to re-
tain possession of the part occupied till due reparation was made
for the murder of her two subjects A few days later von Heyking,
the German minister at Peking, drew up a series of demands, which
were trnsmitted to the Chinese Foreign Office.
less by other ambitious nations. For instance, the famous case
of Pere- Berthellot was utilized by France in exacting privileges
in Yunnan.
1, Japan Weekly Mail, 1897, p. 561, p. 646.
2. Does the action of lease conform to this procla mation ?
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These demands include (1) the building of a memorial to the murder-
ed missionaries; (2) the indemnification of the families of the
murdered men; (3) the degradation of governor Lee, in whose province
the murder took place; (4) the payment of the cost of the Ger-
man occupation Kiao Chow harbor; (5) the severest punishment of
the murderers and local author!"1, ies, and (6) the preference for
German capital and engineers in the future railway and mining en-
terprises in the province of Shangtung, The desire for the lease
1
of Kiao Chow was still v& led.
While consenting to these demands, the Chinese Fo "reign Office
requested the evacuation of Kiao Chow. In reply to zhie, Germany
gave an unqualified refusal, and added that further guarantees
were required for the protection in the future of the life of Ger-
man subjects all over China. Taking this as a justification, Gar-
many now openly expressed a wish to lease Kiao Chow and territory
inland, a demand which was contradictory to her former declaration.
At the same time, with great ostentation Prince Henry of Prus-
an
eia, the brother of the Kaiser was dispatched at the head of^expe-
dition by the Kaiser to China. The kaiser at a banquet given at
ember
Kiel Castle on Dec. 15, 1897, previous to the sailing of the Ger-
A
man squadron for Chir.a, in toasting Prince Henry, said, " The ex-
peditioriwhich you undertake is the logical consequence of what
our sainted grandfather and his great chancellor have politically
organized and what our illustrious father won by his sv?ord on the
battlefield. They were naught but the first realization of the
Trans-Oceanic ambition of the newly united and newly arisen Ger-
1. Presidential Meseage and Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1898, p 188.
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man Empire. German commerce flourishes and develops; and it can
only develop in prosperity and safety when it feels safe under
the Imperial power Imperial power is sea power; sea
power and Imperial power are mutually dependent on each other, so
much so that one can not exist without the other. May our citi-
zens abroad rest absolutely assured that the projection of the em-
pire will every where be given. Should any one infringe our just
right or injure us, then up at him with your Mailed Fist ( Fahre
dem mit gepanzerter Faust ), and if it be God's Will, weave for
your youthful brow a wreath of laurel which no one in all the Ger-
man Empire will grudge you. " Prince Henry in an extraordinary
response said, n My only aim is to preach abroad the gospel of
your sacred Majesty ( Das Evangel ium Eurer Majestat geheiligter
Person im Auslande zu kunden ) , to preach to every one who will
hear it, and also to those who will not hear it. This gospel I
will have inscribed on my banner and I will inscribe it whither-
1
soever I go* "
Although these Kiel speeches were ridiculed as being more suit-
able to heroes of melodrama, either as verging on blasphemy or
as altogether incomprehensible, yet they served quite well to in-
dicate the German attitude toward the Far East. They were, though
empty, yet loud enough to hasten the lease of Kiao Chow, which took
place on the 5th of January 1898, two montha before the signing of
2
the treaty, and over four nonth&before the Prince 1 *, formal au-
dience with Emperor £uan Teu.
1. The two speeches are fully given in fl The Japan Weekly Mail,
1898. p. 85-86.
2. The treaty was signed at Peking by Li Hung Chang, We ng Tung
Ho and von Heyking on the 6ht of March, 1898, see Hertslets'China
Treaties, vol. 1, p. 350.
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Government _under German .Rule
.
The administration after the lease was entrusted to the navy
department, and a naval officer was placed at its head with the
title of governor. The council is composed of all the heads of
the administrative departments under the personal supervision of
the governor and four members chosen from the civil population
and afpoited for two years; the first was named by the governor,
with the consent of the council, the second was chosen fron among
the members of the non- Chinese firms, the third from the list of
taxpayers paying at least $50 Ground Tax, without distinction of
nationality, and the fourth from the commitee of the Chamber of
Commerce. There were judicial officers for European residents,
with an appeal to the German Consular Court at Shanghai; Chinese
residents were subject to this jurisdiction only in special cases.
Germany 1 s Policy in Kiao Chow after Occupation.
After having surveyed the manner of Germany's acquisition of
Kiao Chow, it is not hard to determine her policy of adrainistratioi
and it3 keynote may be immediately noticed from von Diedriche*
procla nation in Chinese: n Be it known to all concerned that I
have come in obedience to the commands of my sovereign, his Ma-
jesty the German Emperor, who has instructed me to land at Kiao
Chow Bay at the head of my forces, and seiz 3 the said Bay and all
the islands and dependencies thereof. Avoid resisting whatever the
German authorities^ siiall decide to do hereafter. You should cal-
culate the exigences of the case, and you will see that you are
too weak to resist. Not only will you find it to be of no advan-
tage to you but you will find that you will have invited destruc-

16
1
tion upon yourselves .
"
Like strong personalities, Germany as well as other nations
is filled with a desire to impress the mark o. her genius upon
the world. This is one of the things which she has been intending
to do in China. In their heart of hearts there can be no truer
that
gratification thanAof hearing their languages spoken in a strange
land, tha
t
n^o
t
f having their customs and institutions acknowledged
as superior by other races, and above all than having their gran-
deur and might worshipped and praised by foreign lands Ignoring
the first two, the last is best expressed in the words of von Bue-
low v " The best pledge for the future is, in our view, the pre-
sence of German ships of war and of^Jerman garrison in Kiao Chow
Bay. The might of the German Empire is thus constantly and visi-
3
bly exhibited to the local authorities as well as its population."
he
And again when emphasizing the seizure of Kiao Chow said :
" We have secured in Kiao Chow a strategical and political posi-
tion which assures us a decisive influence on the future of the
Far East. From this strong position we can look with complacency
on the development of affairs. German diplomacy will pi sue its
path in the East as elsewhere — calmly, firmly and peacefully."
L
1. The Times, Jan. 6, 1898.
3. Ibid, Jan. 35, 1898.
These reveal the fact that in all Germany's administration in
Kiao Chow, the rights and feelings of the Chinese residents were
disregarded. What was adopted, was adopted in the interest of
the Germans. This erritory before the Suropean War broke out
might be saidjfco be , a
o
territory of the Germans, by the Germans, a
and for the Germans, As to the natives, in all affairs, they had
no representation though they paid an ever increasing tax. There
is some reason therefore why the G rmans are called " red devils"
in Kiao Chow. But it must be noticed that the German administra-
tion in Kiao Chow had been much milder and more reasonable if we
compare it with the Russian and the Japanese administration in
Kwan tung.
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In short, to apply artificial force and to provide arbitrary
conditions regardless of Chinese interests in the creation of a
permanent commercial centre and the establishment of a permanent
naval base in Kiao Chow have been Germany's primary policy, and
her \ Itimate policy is to create a sphere of influence and inte-
rest with Kiao Chow as a starting point. In order to understand
better these policies, it is necessary to have a digest of the
treaty and conventions between China and Germany which defines
the scope of action, , and a bird's eye view of the works which the
Germans have undertaken and which constitute the actual expresaion
of these policies.
A Digest of Treaty and Conventions.
In the first place, China is entitled to receive rent from the
German government for the lease of Kiao Chow. This is, however,
considered by the Germans as only a matter of formality. In speak
ing to the Reichstag von Buelow has referred to this matter. "The
rent" he says, " to be paid, will in no case be a large one,
since it is not meant as something paid for the leased land, but
is simply a formality of the nature of what jurists Ca}l a recog-
nition payment, implying an acknowledgment of the continuance of
1
theore tical possession on the part of the Emoeror of China."
2
By the convention of 1906 the Chinese Imperial Maritime Cus-
toms collects duties at the leased port and the customs director
is to be appointed jointly by the German minister at Peking
1. A full copy ofthe speech is given in Japan Weekly Mail,
March 26, 1898, p. 326,
3. A full treatment is given under the heading of " Kiao
Chow as a Port. M

18
and the Commissioner of the Chinese Imperial Customs.
1
In short, within the limit of the leased 193 square miles,
the Chinese government abstains from exercising rights of sove-
reignty during the term of the lease except the right of receiv-
ing a trifling rent and a partial power of collecting customs
duties. Slith these exceptions Germany can do any thing as she
pleases.
In regard to the 50 kilometer neutral zone surrounding the
Kiao Chow Bay at high water,, the Chinese reserve to themselves
all rights of administration except two cases ; first } though
China has the right to station troops and to take other military
measures within that zone, in doing this, she must be in agree-
ment with the German government while the free passage of the
German troops within this zone is permitted at any time ; second*
without the previous consent of the German government China
abstains from taking any measures or issuing any ordinances. With
respect to the mining and railway concession, the four articles
leave China in a helpless position. It is true that Chinese mer-
chants may take share in the formation of the Deutsche- Chines i-
sche Gesellschaft which is established for the construction of
2
the two conceded railway lines. It is still true that the work
of excavating coal within 1G miles along the railways may be un-
dertaken by Chinese and German merchants combining their capital*
But the concluding section explicitly states that n if within the
are
province of Shangtung any matters undertaken, for which foreign
1. Hertslets, China Treaties, p. 352.
2. Detail treatment is given under railways in connection with
Kiao Chow.
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capital or assistance is invited, China agrees that the German
merchants concerned shall first be asked whether they wish to un-
dertake the works and provide the materials. That is to say only
when foreign capital is unnecessary and neither the German govern-
ment nor German capitalists will look at a scheme, is China gra-
ciously permitted to do as she pleases in her own territory. This,
together with the conceded railways and mines, in reality con-
stitute the prophecy of a sphere of influence in the hinterland,
the of
Finally the provision of^return to China
A
Kiao Chow before ex-
piration of lease puts China in a most difficult and indefinite
position. The article rune " Should Germany ( not China ), at
some future time express the wish to return Kiao Chow Bay to China
before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to
Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiao Chow and to cede
to Germany a more suitable place? It means that China has to re-
fund the incurred expenditure and China has to cede a more suitable
place, should Germany return Kiao Chow under suoh conditions. The
insertion of this article hao two obvious aims».(l) After a sphere
of influence has been thoroughly established in the hinterland, if
Kiao Chow were returned to China, it would still fall under the
German influence and China would be helpless to oontrol this se-
parated bit of territory. But Germany would be able to gain a
more suitable place and would be able to utilize the returned ex-
penditure to build a new commercial and political centre and would
be able to start another sphere of influence.. (3) We must remem-
ber that Germany leases Kiao Chow as a protection of German in-
terests in China but what protection has she for the safety of
Kiao Chow itself T It is unquestioned that Germany has tried her
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boot to build etrong forts on it. But can Germany do any thing
to protect this isolated territory in case of unexpected conflict
between the Imprisoned Empire and other powers especially Eng-
1 »nd and Japan T The cautious Teuton thus made every arrangement
to wriggle out, should he be forced to do so by events. With
respect to the first project, conditions perhaps will never per-
mit its realization. It is in the second aim that we fiid the far
reaching policy of the Germane; but Japan has risen up to take
measures before Germany has expressed any intention of turning
it over to China.
A General Survey of Germany*^ Efforts in the Building up
of Kiao Chow.
Kiao Chow, before the German lease, was only a small hamlet
about
consisting of a population of 500 • . Its development is un-
doubtedly an exceedingly difficult and most expensive task. It
is here as well as in Kamerum, Togoland and other places, that we
IX-
see Germany's liberal attitude, strenous efforts and her strong
courage io assuuming risks in a distant territory.
From 1899 up to the Japanese seizure, a period of fifteen
years, the annual average Imperial subvention for Kiao Chow is
about 10,000,000 marks against an annual average expenditure of
13,000,000 marks. The most expensive fiscal year under the German
administration is found in 1905-1906 when the total expenditure
was 15, 296,000 marks out of which sum, 14,000,000 marks consti-
from
tuted a subvention a. the Imperial Government. During the entire
fifteen years, the Imperial government has paid 156,000,000 marks
in subventions, against a total expenditure of 185,000,000 marks.
The enormous sum which has been spent in the building of Kiaochow
<3»*"v •rrftf r
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1999- 00 8, 500,000
1900- 01 9,
12,
780,000
1901- oz coo o/"\o528 , 000
1902- 03 ^ O12, 876,000
O O O /*\ oo088,0001903- 04 13,
1904-05 lo. 296,000
1905- 06 13, 273,000
1906- 07
1907- 08
1908- 09 12, 327,000
1909-10 12, 352,597
1910- 11 12, 722,000
1911- 12 13, 540,000
1912- 13 15, 640,000
1913- 14 16,783,625
ia seen in the following table.
Expenditure Imperial Subvention
Marks Marks
8,500,000
9,730,000
12,168,000
12,421,000
12,533,000
14,000,000
11,735,000
10,601,600
7,704,000
8,298,000
9,560,000
From the above table we see that except the period between
(1902-1908) when harbors and other great works were in the process
of construction, the Imperial subvention remains stationery between
the minimum of 7,000,000 and the maximum of 10,000,000, while
revenue and expenditure increase proportionately. The enormous in-
crease in expenditure accounts for the prosperity pf the territory
and the enormous increase in revenue gives promise of a self-sup-
porting colony. It is quite probable that a yearly surplus of re-
venue over expenditure may be attained as is the case in Hongkong.
It might be a good thing if the Kaiser's declaration "Kiao Chow
musz uns bleiben" might be realised for then Germany may reap the
harvest for which she has toilsomely worked. But the chance seems
in all respect to be favorable to the fortune hunting Japan.
If we are asked in what way have the expenditures been spent
and from what source have the revenues been dramm, the best .
found in
answer we have at our disposal is. the Budget of 1905-6, a most
active year^ which is given as follows:
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1
Budget for Kiao Chow.
( April X, 1905 — March 31, 1906 )
I . Revenue 1
( in pound sterling)
Sales of land 3,447
Direct taxes . 4,406
Other receipts 24,279
Imperial subsidy .717 ,607
Total 748,739
II. Expenditure.
( in pouno sterling'
Recurring expenditure
Civil administration 53,928
Naval administration 74,257
Chinese regiment 1,346
Rations 30,894
Clothing 10,655
Artillery and fortification 15,595
Maintenance of public buildings 17,685
Horses harness, carts 8,865
Public worship and education 3,493
Hospitals and sanitary service 17,698
Treasury 5,586
Miscellaneous 53, 556
Pension fund 441
Total recurring expenditure 293,999
Non-recurring expenditure
Harbor works 170,004
Buildings and land purchase .....96,138
Industrial dwelling 4,895
Forestry and regulation of streams .... 3,916
Armaments 122,375
Bouys and .surveys 1,958
5th instalment floating docks ...53,845
For unfors
A
een expenses
- 1 , 609
Total non-recurring expenditure 453,640
Grand total 748,739-
From the above table we learn that out of a total expenditure
of 748,739 -L, 223,649 i» were used in the construction of harbor,
and floating docks, 222,438 L were used in military and naval
works and only 53,928 L for civil administration. The harbors and
docks are directly related to naval administration so out of the
total expenditure, 60$ were spent for military and naval purposes.
The fort ideations, harbor and the docks further have to be continued
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for many years before reaching; completion.
Besides theee expenditure*, the Schangtung Eieenbahn Geeell-
echaft was formed in June 1899, with a capital of M. 54,000,000
( L 2,700,000 ), to construct the railways. Two famous mining
companies, the Schangtung Bergbaugeeellechaf t, and the Deutsche
Gesellschaft fur Bergbau und Industrie im Auslande have been
successively established for exploitation. The former was orga-
nized by some of the most powerful German bankers and with a
capital of 12,000,000 marks ( L 600,000 ), while the latter was
a Kolonial Gesellschaft , a species of chartered company, with
powers oonferred on it by the Bundesrath.
Thus from the year 1898? when the territory was leased up to
the Japanese occupation, it is estimated that $123,575,000 a sum
which equals half of the Russian investment in Manchuria ( $257,
500,000 ) up -o 1904, has been spent by the German- government
and the railway and mining companies acting under the government
supervision in the development of Kiao Chow,
The Deutsche Asiatische Bank with a capital of 5,000,000 tie,,,
and some minor corporations such as the Commercial Association
of Shangtung with a capital of 240,000 marks and the Kiao Chow
Association with a capital of 204,000 marks have also taken ac-
tive part in the development of Kiao Chow,
Thus to the Germane colony acquisition has proved itself an
expensive luxury. They seem to regard it worth the cost. The
enormous increase in revenue has already given assurance to their
expectation. And as Mr. Keller says, " By this lavishness , the
Germans thought to raise the importance of the empire in the eyes
of the world.
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In addition to the pouring; in of capital which overwhelms Kiao
Chow, we find there an army of penetration of officials, soldiers,
engineers, fortune hunters who call themselves patriots and who
sow the seed which, they hope, will steadily " expand into a beau-
tiful Imperial tree " on which they hope to hang " an eastern po-
licy of a most astonishing character,
"
So much for the general survey of Germany's effort in develop-
ing Kiao Chow; let us now pass toe a view of some of the most im-
portant works in a some what detailed manner.
Taingtao ae a port,
Tsingtao is the name of the port, and Kiao Chov. that of the
whole territory. On September 2, 1895, it was declared a free port,
and the Chinese Imperial Custom House collected duties at the rail-*
way station. But in 1906 a new convention came into force whereby
Teingtau ceased to be a free port, and the Chineee Imperial Mari-
time Customs now collects duties here as at all the other treaty
ports of China. But the convention among other things stipulates
that 20$ of the money so collected at Teingtau shall be paid to
the German Government. According to the statistics of the year
1912 the customs revenue amounts to 1,670,029 taels out of which
334,006 taels are turned over to Germany. Is it not interesting
to observe that China has leased this territory for a trifling
rent which von Buelow called simply e a "recognition payment"
and yet now the owner must pay 334,006 taels to the tenant for the
establishment of a customs house on it? This change, which, in Mr
Rockhill's words^ is on each side of the nature of a special con-
cession for a special consideration,will, however, facilitate work
officers
for both merchant and customs, as well as increase revenue, in
A
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addition to placing the Kiao Chow customs house functioi in
1
Tangtao on an improved footing. This together with the new cus-
toms arrangement in 1909 han contributed some to the promotion
of trade at Kiao Chow. The growth of t*ade at Kiao Chow from 1900
2
to 1912 is seen in the following table :
Date Import Export
V UK .lib, ) I Hit • Oic , /
1900 158,598 32,282
1901 2,527,609 18,370
1902 3,678,690 105,272
1903 5,134,229 234,216
1904 3,437,897 845,302
1905 4,372,937 2,430,350
1906 7,019,263 3,540,123
1907 7,297,944 887,226
1908 8,266,562 2,707,707
3,359,3861909 10,655,398
1910 25,409,209 17,171,415
1911 26,287,988 19,853,669
1912 29,742,731 24,999,360
From 1900 to 1912 the value of trade at Kiao Chow has multiplied
280 times while the customs revenue has multiplied as many as 300
times. Within the last five years it has risen from w^ty-sec port
in the amount of revenue that its customs receipts turn into the
s ixth.Chinese government, to the A port, being exceeded in its busi-
ness, as indicated in this unique record, only by Shanghai, Tien-
tsin, Hankow, Canton, and Swatow. Datten is the seventh, being
260,000 tie. below Kiao Chow. Dairen of course has moved more ra-
pidly than has Kiao Chow. In|jl907 Daixen's revenue amounted to
140,738 tis. but increased to 1,407,926 tie. in 1912, while the
revenue of Kiao Chow increased from 934,623 tis. in 1907 to 1,670,
029 in 1912. The rate of increase of the revenue of Kiao Chow
1. U. S. Consular and Trade Reports, 1906, p. 179,
2. Statesman's Year Book, 1902 1914.

during tttiie period is only one sixth aa rapid as that of Dairen.
Although Dairen has in five years almost matched Kiao Chow in
trade, it is still safe to aay that except Lairen no other port
and
in China has grown as Kiao Chow has grown, no other port sav Dai-
ren and Shanghai can stand the pace Kiao Chow has set.
However, it should not be overlooked that the commerce of this
port is not yet entirely free from the artificial conditions under
which it was created. The prosperity of its trade still depends
the
more or less on the disbursements of the government and* colonists.
The frequent report of the Japanese inability to restore its com-
merce, if substantiated, will prove truth of this.
Kiao Chow Bay, as. a. Naval, Base
.
The bay itself has been described as the natural entrance and
exit for Shangtung and the maritime key of the province. This is
a thing which Germany has hunted for years in Chinese waters. This
is a thing which is essential to the realization of the Kaiser's
ambition," Imperial power means sea power." So the construction
of a naval base at Kiao Chow Bay deserves immediate consideration.
As soon as the Germans took over control, the present vast
scheme of fortifications, already decided upon, was inaugurated
by an army of engineers and skilled workmen specially sent from
home. They constructed a ring of 12 modern forts, stretching from
the high, rocky peninsula of Laoshan on the north, along the thick-
ly wooded ridges back of Taingtao, six miles from the harbor mouth,
and out again along the southern peninsula of Lingshan. They spent
$ 7,000,000 in dredging the harbor and the bay; they constructed
a floating dock capable of lifting sixteen thousand tons; they
sunk granite piers about 2,000 meters long, and built a modern
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gracing dock capable of accomodating the largest merchant ships
and men-of-war afloat. In ten years $ 30,000,000 was spent on
harbor works alone. Ship building is carried on at the naval
base, both for merchant ile trade and naval purposes. Indeed, it
icould be possible, given the raw materials, to build and equip any-
thing up to second class cruisers. The barracks built in 1908
were capable of housing 5,000 men ; and the 3,000 first sent put
have b en steadily increased till before the war the regular for-
ces defending the territory, excluding 2,500 volunteers from the
settlement itself, numbered over 6,000 including a souadron of ca-
valry, a company of field artillery, two machine gun companies,
five companies of naval artillery, one aeroplane corps of four
unite, and a company of native reserves". The Kiao Chow service
the
was popular in Deutschland and young men from best families en-
tered it with the double purpose of serving their country ang in-
dulging their curiosity in regard to the Far East.
The military necessit of the leased territory have begun only
in the present decade to make way for the industrial campaign for
which it has always been the far reaching ground-breaker. Inva-
riably up to the year before last £ 1913 ) , out of an average
budget of 13,000,000 marks, something like 10,000,000 marks have
beea contributed by the Imperial Treaeuy at Berlin and mainly used
for these extraordinary expenditures. It is said that the Prus-
sian officers have spent ten dollars on military works to every
one dollar on the civilian population.
The two coal fields at Weiheien and Poshan which are near to
1. Outlook, Nov. 11, 1914, p. 582.
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a
the port are averaging to-day an annual production of just half
A
million tone and renders Kiao Chow a good coaling station for a
fleet and other ships.
Furthermore the decision of the German exploiting company, the
Schangtung Eieenbahn Gesellschaf t , to spend $ 12,000,000 in the
erection of a vast steel and iron plant at Tsingtao makes men feel
great plar?>are working out in their develo ment and approaching
nearer and nearer to their practical realization. At the same meet
ing, on Jane 5,1914, it was decided to include an arsenal in the
new works. This plant;, if completed, would have been able to bur-
nish any thing essential to the formation Of Kiao Chow into the
strongest naval and military foothold in the Far East.
Frederick List, the German economist, has long since unfolded
the principle that communication, politics, and commerce must go
hand in hand. Kiao Chow furnishes its concrete manifestation.
It was Germany' 8 ambition to create out of Kiao Chow a second San-
Franciscc , and to build in Shangtung a sphere of irfluence which
will control the vast hinterland. How did she plan for it ? Noth-
could
ing short of a vast scheme of railways ^ accomplish that end. Im-
perial power means not only sea power but also means railway power.
It is exceedingly interesting that in Kiao Chow we find that the
Imperial power has tried to manefest itself through both channels.
In connection with the lease of Kiao Chow, China agrees to per-
mit Germany to construct two railways in the province of Shangtung:
one from Kiao Chow, pafi* Weihsian, Chingchow, Poshan, Tsuchuan,
and Tsonping to Tsinan and the Shangtung frontier; the other from
Kiao Chow to Ichow and thence past Laiwuhsien to Tsinan. The rail-
Railways in Connection with Kiao Chow.
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way from Tainan to the frontier of Shangtung is not to be con-
structed until the main line is completed and its route is still
1
left to be determined. The proposed line betv/een Ichow and lei-
nan was abandoned in favor of the Chinese Imperial Tientsin- Pukow
Railway which is financed by the Anglo- German Syndicate amd ma-
2
naged by the Chinese government. " The Kiao Cow - Ichow line was
3
surveyed but further work abandoned. So the only railway conced-
ed to Germany requiring consideration is the line between Kiao Chovi
via Weihsien?^Poshan to Tainan.
This railway was conducted by the Schangtung Eieenbahn Gesell-
schaft which was organized at Berlin with a Capital of 54,000,000
marks. The main line from Tsintao - Tainan, a diatance of 256 mi-
lea wa8 opened to traffic in June, 1904. The two branches, Chang-
tien- Poehan and Taaochuan - Taichuan respectively, were opened
to traffic in 1910. Taking all together it makes a total trackage
4
of 310 miles*
From the opening of the main line dates the commercial pros-
perity of the settlement. w This ie not to be wondered at. Being
put in pos8eaeion of a first clasa harbor and a railway connecting
d©ns e 1v
with the very heart of the moat populous country in the world,
A
hitherto without mesane of communication, the proaperity of Kiao
5
Chow worked ite own way." The yearly value of trade at Kiao
Chow has already been diecusaed in a former aection, let us now
eee what proportion of the trade this railway carriee aince it8
1. HertsleteJ China Treaties, vol.1, p. 353.
2. The Far Eastern Review, Nov. 1909, p. 286.
3. Ibid.
4. China's Year Book, 1914, p. 213.
5. Jouraal of American Asiatic Association, January 1915, p. 367
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inauguration :
Date Annual passengers Annual freight Annual net profit
heads tons marks
1904 558,863 179,370
1905 803,527 310,482 2,063,572
1906 846,000 381,000 2,642,000
1911 909,065 717,189 4,731,238
1913 1,230,043 852,001 7,050,000
According these figures, during the last eight years, passenger
traffic has been more than doubled, freight traffic has been in-
creased more than four times while the net profit has been increas-
ed three and half times. The proportional increase in traffic of
a is to come
the past showsA s :ill greater volume of transactions A in the future.
The net profit of 191£ was high enough to compensat^P^the
Imperial subvention, being 7,000,000 marks against 7,704,000 marks.
One of the direct effects of this railway is the retarding of
the trade of Chefoo, the Chinese treaty port, which is shown in
1
the following table :
Date Import Export
( hk,tls.) ( hk.tls.)
1905 9,607,561 4,677,509
1906 7,906,839 4,806,654
1907 6,620,215 3,299,002
1908 6,182,640 3,524,592
1909 5,999,755 4,037,687
1910 15,464,159 14,731,624
1911 16,654,026 13,916,518
1913 15,872,719 13,863,731
From the above table we notice that from the opening of the
railway, the imports of Chefoo decreased, from 9,607,561 hk,tls.
to 5,999,755 hk.tls. while exports decreased from 4,677,509 hk.tls
to 4,037,687 hk.tls. There was a sudden increase of trade value
1. Statesman^ Year Book, 1907 -1914.
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1
in Chefoo from 1910 due to the opening of the northern section
of the Tientain-Pukow Railway, yet after the sudden increase its
trade remains practically stationary while during the same time
2
the trade of Kiao Chow has increased 20$. A more striking illus-
tration of the decline of Chefoo and the rise of Kiao Chow will
be noticed in the amount of revenue collected at each of the
3
ports :
Date Customs revenue Customs revenue
at Chefoo at Kiao Chow
(hk.tls.) (hk.tls.)
1905 871,607 545,150
1906 818,322 863,430
1907 633,243 934,623
1908 644,914 926,716
1909 748,338 1,120,243
1910 651,265 1,2?8,394
1911 595,914 1,251,001
1912 704,735 1,670,029
From the year 1905 up to 1912, while Kiao Chow as a port rises
sixteenth sixth
from the . place to the ys place, Chefoo drops from th- tenth
teanth
to the four among the 47 ports according to the total amount of
customs revenue collected at each.
Not only the maritime customs revenue shows the decline of Che-
but
foo, the revenue of the native customs which exists side by side
ever
with the former shows the conclusion^more clearly. In 1909
it was estimated to be 97,609 hk.tls., it decreased to 76,262 hk.
tls. in 1910, a little rise in 1911 but in 1912 it suddenly de-
creased to 68,823 hk.tls.
The case is also remarkably illustrated in the trade of straw
1. China's Year Book, 1914, p. 223.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 139 and p. 122. However, we must admit that ac-
cording to recent report$of the customs house, the trade of Che-
foo during 1912 and 1913 has shown some increase and has kept up
well.
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braid ; of the total export of this product of home industry from
the two Shangtung ports in 1903, Chefoo contributed 70/ and Kiao
Chow, 30/ . The change took place so remarkably that Kiao Chow has
entirely displaced Chefoo in this export. This is clearly shown
1
in the following table :
Date Kiao Chow Chefoo
cwts cwts
1908 99,701 930
1909 125,315 388
1910 119,068 25
1911 104,764 5
enabled to
The railway has also Tsingtao capture practically the whole
of the raw silk and ground nut trade from Chefoo.
Another important direct effect of this railway concession is
found in the scheme of the Chinese Tientsin-Fukow Railway. The ori-
ginal concession for the railway from Tientsin to Chinkiang was
granted in 1897 to Dr. Yung Wing, with permission to enlist the
aid of foreign capital. Dr. Yung Wing entered into negotiations
with American and British capitalists for a loan which was estimate
ed as | 27,000,000 gold. The Germans aimed at the abolition of Dr.
Yung's noble plan by seeking to apply to it the special privileges
whicr were officially granted in 1898, many months later than the
sanction of Dr. Yung's plan. Germany's demand was evidently a vio-
for
lation of the agreement which provided ^ German participation in
foreign loans only after its signing. But Germany finally blocked
further hope for Dr. Yung and the American capitalists. An agree-
1. House of Coramonioessional Paper, 1912-1913, vol. 95, p. 79, p.
183.
2. The Far Eastern Review, 1909, November No. p. 309.
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ment was formally signed and sealed in 1898, which provided that
the construction and control of the railway should be held in the
hands of the Chinese government and that the Anglo - German .syndi-
cate should furnish a loan of fc 5, 000, 000, some materials and engi-
neers. The British and German chief engineers were, however, sub-
ordinated to the control of the Chinese managing director.
Having surveyed some of the effects of the Tsingtao - Tsinan
Railway concession, let us now see what an important position Tsing
tao occupies on account of the very important matter of railway con
nections
.
In the first place the Tsinan- Tientsin Railway connects Tsing-
tao with Tientsin, Peking, Mukden, Kalgan, Saint Petersburg, Berlin,
and the pest of Europe through the northern section of the Tien-
tsin-Pukow Railway(390i m.), Peking - Mukden Railway(527 m.), Pe-
king -Kalgan Railway ( 124 m.), The Chinese Eastern Railway ( 1081
m.) and the trajs -Siberian Railway. The projected extension ( 600
m.), of the Peking - Kalgan Railway through Suiyuanhen, Tatungfu,An<(
Urga will render a more immediate connection between Tsingtao and
the trans-Siberian Railway at Khailar. The southern section of
the T ients in- Pukdw Railway ( 236^ m. ), furnishes a conn©cti between
Tsingtao and Nanking, the ancient capital of China, and thereby
the Shanghai - Nanking Railway ( 193 m.) and the Kiangsu-Chekiang
Rail7/ay (241 m.) *onnect Tsingtao with Shanghai, Hangchow and Ning-
po. By way of the Yangtze River via the projected line between
Nanchang and Chaochov and the Chaochow - Swatow line^rne can reach
the coast of Fukien at Swatow. Towards the end of 1913, it was an-
nounced that the German government had concluded an agreement with
China for the construction of other lines. First, the Kaomi- Han-
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chwang line will draw to Tsinftao not only more iron and coal but
also bean* and wheat. Second^ , a line has been projected con-
necting the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Peking-Hankow Railway
( 755 m»), between Tsinan and Shunteh. Tj^.s will enable Tsingtao
to come into direct communication with Hankow, the socalled the
Chicago of China ; and through the projected Hankow- Canton Rail-
way, Tsingtao will able to effect indirect communication with Can-
ton. A more important scheme is seen in the Yenchow-Kaifen Rail-
way. Yenchow is already in connection with Tsingtao through the
Tientsin-Pukow Railway. ItY#|& Germany's secret plan to connect Yen-
chow with Kaifen so that Tsingtao may in the future have direct
communication on one hand with Honan, Tongjkuan,Sianfu, Lanchow,and
Hi through the projected North- Western Grand Trunk System which
will, as Mr. Harding says, 'one day pierce the heart of the Asiatic
continent from the trans-Caspian outposts of Russia three thousand
miles across the vast unknown dese rts of Chinese Turkestan and
will sweep thence through the centre of China to the sea ; and on
to connect
the other hand with Chunking, Chengtu, and French Indo- China thru
the projected Sian-Chunching, -Yunnan- French Indo China line of
which 1,400 miles connection southward to Chungking have already
been guaranteed and signed. The Yenchow-Kaifen line has already
been surveyed by the Germans in 1910, and constitutes a brand of
the German section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. For the moment
the line ends at Tsiningchow but the course planned indicates that
then
it will be continued- to Kaifen. Tsingtao having this line in
connection with the splendid harbor which sha has at her dis-
1. China's Year Book, 1914, p. 210.
»4<
r
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po:al will naturally serve as the outlet of these vast systems,"
From the above survey, It is thus safe to conclude that north-
ward, southward, and westward Tsingtao will be all powerful as soon
as these railway systems have been completed. .s in Manchuria,
everything here has been planned on the most extensive scale, and
everywhere there are evidences that a notable future is being
1
thought of #
Other Works Undertaken by Germany*
It has been pointed out in the former paragraphs that Germany
ambition is not only to create at Kiao Chow a commercial centre and
a naval base but also to create a sphere of influence in the
hinterland. While under railways and military undertakings Germany's
aims have been touched upon, some other miscellaneous attempts will
here be discussed.
(a) Coal Mining.-- The railway concession carries with it the
right of mining. The treaty stipulates that Germany can mine coal
within the 30 kilometer zone. But, as Mr. Weale poiibts out, the fields
are far beyond the legal limit. The annual production was constant-
a
ly increasing until 1912, it reached over half million tons or one
e e
two-thousand- thre-hundred-thirtith of the world production. Its
annual production is presented here :
Date Fantze mine Hungshan mine Total
tons tons tons
1907 145,000 34,200 179,200
1908 222,450 56,600 279,050
1909 272,000 160,000 432,000
1910 230,064 252,816 482,880
1911 184,233 302,300 486,533
1912 573,676
1. The treatm,e it of this section is based on the data furnished
in China's Year Book, 1914, p. 208-244.
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(b) Afforestation.- In Kiao Chow a n in other German colonies
scientific investigations of the most valuable kind have been made in
coincidence with the advance of expeditions and of administrative
station ; and this is found in the work of afforestation. One
hundred and forty four acres of land have been put under culti-
vation ; a million trees and plants have been sold to natives an-
nually. This work is very productive in Kiao Chow. An annual re-
1
venue of about 100,000 marks has been drawn from this source.
(6) Post Office.- The Deutsche Reichspost has made its
way in inland. On every German train a section of a carriage is
given up to the German postal authorities. It has maintained a
rate cutting competition against the Chinese post office.
(d) Attempts to secure advisorship .- It has also been stated
by Mr. Weale that the Germans have been trying very hard to obtain
the appointment of a German foreign advisor to the governor of
Shangtung.
(e) Missionary .'/orks.- " AS in Occidental Africa", Mr. Chera-
dame remarks, " the German missionaries prepare for political pe-
2
netration." He even goes so far as to include missions under ad-
ministrative organization. In fact Bishop Anzer, the head of the
Catholic Mission in Shangtung has declared that the occupation of
3
Kiao Chow is a matter of life and death to German missionaries.
In exciting public sentiment to aspire for the union of missions
and colonial policy, the German professor, Mr. Mirbt has openly
declared," auch Mission und Kolonial Politik gehoren zusammen und
wir haben Grund zu der Hoffnung, dasz aus diesen Bund gutes fiir
4
unsere Kolonien erwachsen wird."
1. House of Commons sessional Paper, 1912-13, vol. 75, -183.
2. Cheradame,La Colonisation et le colonies Allemande ,p . 127
.
5 * S.g 8_y_9*L Bue 1 o
w
1
s 3p ee ch, The Japan Weekly Mail, March, 1898.
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The present German missionary force in Kiao Chow consists of
fifteen ordinary and three extra-ordinary missionaries. Although
who
the writer believes there must be someA are sincere in their spiri-
tual purpose yet the fact that they receive financial assistance
»te
from the government tends to obliga^thera to work for their Vater -
1
"
land as well as for the Kingdom of God.
(f ) Education.-- The process of Germanizing this leased terri-
tory will not be completed without a predominance of German culture,
This is done in the establishment of schools. "Tsingtao',' one writer
remarks, "has more schools and gymnasiums than any other town of the
^ eg.
.same size.'' Segration between the Chinese and Europeans is rigor-
ously insisted on. Nine schools are directly supported by the Ger-
man government. Mr. Mirbt has plainly told us, :t die Eroberung
unserer Kolonien durch die Schulen" because, he thinks, " die Ibeute
verlangen allenthalben nach einer bessern Bildung und namentlich
3
nach einer Kenntis des Deutschen." However, it must be given cre-
dit that some young men are indebted to these schools for their in-
toward
spiration ^ scientific research.
( g) Land Question.-- The Germanization of Kiao Chow
not
will be completed without the entire deprivation of land ownership
of the Chinese residents. If the Chinese wishes to sell any land,
they can only sell to the German government whiQ^resells to European
4
settlers,-- almost entirely Germans. The buye.- of land must pay
a tax of 33$ of the cost, and if the plot of land is not sold for
4. ( of p. 36./ Mirbt, Mission uhd Kolonial Politik,
.
p 4, p.71.
1. The German Colonial System, p. 3.
2. Journal, American Asiatic Association, January 1915, p. 365.
3. Mirbt, Mission und Kolonial Politik, p. 158.
4. Colquhoun, The Mastery of the Pacific, p. 409.
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25 years, the owner of the land has to give notice of any intend-
ed sale and the government has the first option to buy at the own-
er's figure. Every land owner has to pay each year a tax of S% of
up 1 1
the capital value. If the land was not being built^ai, a certain
in the
date s tipulated^plan of building, the owner for '.ei ted the right of
property and the government took It up, paying only half the as-
sessed value. This was, however, changed by the order of December
31, 1903 which provides a progressive land value tax instead of for
1
feiting the right of property. At any rate, within 25 years, the
German government has been trying to take the entire con-
ed
trol of land property in Riao Chow out of the hand of the Chinese.
A
a
Evidently Germany , under the disguise ofA single tax, has done the
that
same thing in Kiao Chow ^ she has done in Poland. Of course, She
has justified herself in doing this that " dadurch ist die Land-
speculation im Schutzgebiet von jeder Betatigui.g zuruckgehalten
worden, und der otadt hast das Heft der Grund-und Boden-Politik
2
in der Hand behalten."
Main Characteristics of Kiao Chow under German Administration .
It is In the characteristics of Kiao Chow that we see both Ger-
many's strength and her inherent defects. On the one hand, Germany
has practically Germanized the territory of Kiao Chow. A special
commissioner for the Engineer picture squely says," Everywhere, ever
thing was German. The officials were German, the language was Ger
1
man, the coinage was German. All goods not produced in Shangtung
1. V/estra.,vol. 70, p. 17-21.
2. Grotewold, Unser Kolonialwesen, p. 181.
3. This, however, is not quite true except in the Germans them-
selves. See p. 39.
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were brought from Germany from a needle to an electric crane. There
was no leakage and no exception. One remarkable thing is that pidg-
1
in German La unknown."
But in spite of the predominance of German civilization in Kiao
Chow, the territory is little more than billets for a number of
officials and soldiers. In the statistics of 1913, there were
3,806 Germans out of the total white population in Kiao Chow but
ed
2,638 of them were official persons, who compris1 Atwo- thirds of the
German population. The place is artificially created and artifi-
cially maintained and is governed by red tape. The policy is to se
cure immediate and direct advantage to the mother country. The Ger-
man merchants find themselves treated by their own officials like
recruits in the hands of Prussian officers, of whom most are igno-
rant of commercial interests and have a fine contempt for trade.
So although the territory was under German administration, the small
ness of Germany's trade in Kiao Chow was quite insignificant as com
pared with Japan in Dairen and England in Hong Kong. This is wit-
to 2
nessed
N
in the trade of 1910 :
Germany's share Total trade % of Total
Imports 109,000 L 3,501,000 L 2.9i
Exports 17,000 L 2,369,000 L .8%
3
It is due to these reasons that Mr. Colquhoun draws the conclu-
sion that the Germans merchants, however enthusiastic they may be
over the colonial policy, have hitherto shown a marked disincli-
4
nation to settle or invest at Kiao Chow and that Mr. Hart aptly
1. Journal of the American Asiatic Association, Jan. 1915, p. 365.
2. Hard and Castle, German Sea Power, p. 288.
3. Colquhoun, The Mastery of the pacific, p. 408.
4. Hart, The Obvious Ofcient, p. 226.
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remarks that the population is almost all military and official ;
genuine German colonists will not come out to Tsingtao on faith,
Germany is surpassingly fitted for scientific colonization but it
is a pity that she has stood at the same time for other things
which have tended to neutralize and obscure her success and to
the
cast ridicule upon .social sciences. This autocratic idea is cer-
tainly an inherent defect in the German system of national expan-
sion. Kiao Chow would be far more flourishing if the German mer-
chants might enjoy to the same degree the most complete liberty,
courtesy, and consideration in the treaty ports of China. German
writers have been almost unanimous in condemning this bureaucracy
but as the Kaiser says, 11 if we wish to accomplish anything in the
world, the pen will be powerless to carry it out."
1
CHAPTER III.
KWANTUNG.
1
Port Arthur, Talienwan and the southern Liaotung Peninsula . com-
prising the Russian leased territory, combined under the name of
the Province of Kwantung,are situated on the southern most extre-
mity of the i rovince of Shengking. This territory has an area of
%
about 1,256 square miles, exclusive of a neutral zone and the wa-
ters surrounding the leased territory. It was leased to Russia on
March 26, 1898, and ruled under her administration until New Year's
Day of 1905 when the Japanese received the Russian General Stoes-
sel's surrender of the whole territory. China's official recogni-
c^mber
tion of the transfer was concluded in a treaty with Japan on De
^
22nd, 1905.
Kwantung has a distinct feature in the fact that unlike Kiao
Chow, it has one port for naval operations and another for commer-
cial transactions. It has Port Arthur for the purpose of the for-
mer and Talienwan for the latter.
1. Talienwan is also called Dalny or Dairen.
2. The neutral zone is situated to the north of the boundary
of the leased territory. Its northern boundary commences on the
west coast of Liaotung at the mouth of the Raichow River, passes
north of Yu- Yen Chang to the Tayang River, and follows the left
bank of that river to its mouth which is included in the neutral
zone •
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The importance attaching to Port Arthur as a naval base is sur-
passed by none in the Chinese waters. Its superb position is evi-
denced by the fact that in the husso- Japanese ar, it took the Ja-
panese 156 days to capture it. bo far as power of resistance in mo-
secorr
dern times is concerned, it stands onl;: to Sevastopol which
took 327 days before its fall and to Przemysl which it recently took
1
200 days to capture. Port Arthur is the key to Manchuria as 203 Me-
ter Hill is the Key to Fort Arthur. Its position is rendered more
important by its nearness to .eking, the capital of China.
ith respect to Talienwan, or Dairen, its rate of growth in com-
merce since the Japanese occupation surpasses all other ports even
Kiao Chow. Mr. Langhorae has every reason to justify his statement
that it is the Southhampton of the East.
In every respect the leased territory Kwantung stands first in
importance except only that ov/loon ranks ahead of it by rea-
son of the immense volume of commerce at Hong Kong. It controls
the outlet of coal mines which according to 1913 are more than four
times as rich as those in the hinterland of Kiao Chow. A net work
of 701 miles of railways, which in length is a little more than 2-g-
times the German system in Kiao Chow, is under the direct control
of South Manchurian Railway Company and is in direct connection
with both Qairen and Port Arthur while its connection with Peking,
a
Seoul, Kalgan, Newchuang, Harbin, Vldisvostok and the tra^s-Siberian
Railway is far more immediate than the Tsinan- KiaoChow sys tem. Kwan-
tung f s mastery of the situation is certainly most powerful and most
formidable
.
1. Outlook, March 31, 1915,
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Port Arthur, Tallenwan and the Casslnl Convention.
In the Autumn of 1896, the world was startled by the publica-
1
tion of the Casslni Convention, a memorandun filed by Cassini, the
Russian Minister to Peking, with the Chinese government in proof
-
form. It clearly shows the Russian intention in regard to Port Ar-
thur and Talienwan. Article 10 says," As the Liaotung ports of
Lushunkow( Port Arthur), and Talienwan and their dependencies are
important strategic points, it shall be incumbent upon China to
properly fortify them with all haste and to repair all their for-
tifications, etc., in order to provide against future dangers ;
Russia shall, therefore^ lend all necessary assistance in helping
to protect these ports, and shall not permit any foreign power to
encroach upon them. China, on her part, also binds herself never to
cede them to another country, but if, in future, the exigencies of
the case require it, and Russia should find herself suddenly in-
volved in a war, China consents to allow Russia temporarily to con-
centrate her land and naval forces within the said ports, in order
the better to enable Russia to attack the enemy, or to guard her
own position. 1 There has been a long dispute, since its' publica-
tion, as to whether it was simply a ballon d 'essai or a permanent
arrangement. The f act that it was denounced by both parties on
account of premature publication was, however, by no means a proof
that it was not in accord with Russia's real manipulations, though^
as believed by best authorities, it was never ratified.
Port Arthur, Talienwan and Germany's Occupation of Klao Chow .
1. For whole text of the Convention see Wealds " The Reshaping
of the Far East " vol. 2, p. 439.
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It ha; been point) d out in the second chapter that the Cassini
Convention had hastened the German occupation of Kiao Chow ; it is,
however, no less true that the German occupation of Kiao Chow in
turn hastened and made definite the realization of Russia's mani-
pulation in Fort Arthur, Talienwan and other places. Vihen Germany
suddenly put landing parties on shore and hoisted her flag over
Kiao Chow Bay, the Russians were not only completely taken by sur-
prise but in addition they were very much enraged. A compromise
must be made if disputes were to be avoided. It was when thi^s were
at this stage that one of those memorable meetings between the Kai-
ser and the Czar took place. How the compromise was made is seen
1
in the simple language : " We occupied Kiao Chow because we desired
reparation and a coaling station. We understand that the Cassini
Convention was simply a ballon d'essai and not a permanent arran-
gement. A year and more had passed since itb publication and de-
nouncement, and you took no steps to carry out its main provisions.
Therefore we were forced to the conclusion that you had reconsiderec
your position. It is perhaps best so. For we cannot and do not in-
tend to retreat ; We have important interests in the Far East which
must be consolidated Russia's true objectives are ice free
ports connected by rail with her own territory. Your strength is
in your many millions, and your strength must be shown more on land
than on sea. Take the end of the Liaotung Peninsula; connect Port
a
Arthur and Talienwan with your trans -Manchuria, Baikal-Vldivostok
A
Railway, by the straightest possible route , and you will be in a
position you could never hope to occupy by seizing a detached lease
1. Weale, The Reshaping of the Ear East, vol.1, p. 344.
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as Kiao (J how." Jo in the words of Putman ;Jeale,"The substitution
in the Russian leasing agreement of a vigorous and definite lan-
guage in place of the vague and irresolute phrasing of the Cassi-
ni instrument must be directly attributed to German influence and
to the use of German models."
The Story of the Russian Occupation.
With this mutual understanding, we find on Dec. 18, 1897, one
month later than the German occupation of Kiao Chow, three Russian
war vessels arriving at Port Arthur. Soon after the appearance of
Russian squadron, Admiral Buller of the British navy arrived at
T mulpo with seven ships and ordered two ships to proceed to Port
Arthur. This was however recalled on the protest from Russia. Four
days later it was officially explained by Count Muravieff that the
step taken was entirely a question of convenience for the ships,
and had absolutely no connection with the occupation of the Bay
of Kiao Chow by the Germans. The Count further stated that though
Port Arthur furnished many advantages for reppiring and for free-
dom from ice in the winter yet Vladisostok was at present furnished
a.
with powerful ice breaker and would remain as their centre in the
A
Far East. England which at that time had more suspicions than any
other country except China over the action which Russia had just
taken, seized upon the declaration of the Russian Minister by de-
manding firmly the opening of Talienwan to foreign trade, which
A
was, among other things, to forestall the possible Russian occupa-
tion of this port as v/ell as Port Arthur. This struck at the root
of the matter and made the Russian&very indignant. So the Russian
1. As a condition of a loan agreement between China and England.
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ambassador at London urged very strongly that if the British Govern
ment insisted on making Talienwan an open port, it would be en-
croaching on the Russian sphere of influence and denying Russia
in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the
progress of events had given her a claim. At the same time the
Russian c large d'affaires told the Tsungli Yamen at Peking that if
it constituted Talienwan an open port it would incur the hostility
of Russia by doing so. England was thus obliged to sign the loan
agreement without the Talienwan clause. Eut Russia did not stop
with the striJ&lng out of this clause; she boldly went a step fur-
ther by bringing forward, on March 7, her long cherished design of
the lease of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the railway concession
from Petma on the Trans -Manchnnian Railway to the ports on the pre-
text of equal rights with the German agreement which was concluded
on >'arch 6. England again protested that Port Arthur was not a
commercial centre; England would not object to the Russian lease
of an ice free commercial harbor connected by rail with the Trans-
Siberian Railway but questions of an entirely different kind were
opened if Russia obtained control of a military port in the neigh-
borhood of Peking. The Russians, however, cared nothing for these
1
empty words. And she had her lease signed on the 27th of March,
Government during the Russian Rule .
By the regulation of 1899, the Kwantung government was placed
under the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of v7ar with its
chief seat of administration at Port Arthur. The administration
was headed by a governor, appointed and removed at the immediate
1# Hertslets', China Treaties, vol. 1, p. 505.
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will of the Czar, who was commander- in- chief of the army and na-
tl e
vy forces in Gis-Amur region, Port Arthur, and Vladivostok.
A
Talienwan being mainly open to foreign trade, its organization
and administration were placed on a separate basis from the rest
of Kwantung. An Imperial order vfas promulgated on July 30, 1899,
ordering that near Talienwan a new town named Dalny should be
created. By the provisional regulations of August 20, of the same
year already referred to, the organization was assigned to the
Chinese Eastern Railway Company under the chief direction of the
Minister of Finance, and its administration was entrusted to a
prefect, to be appointed and dismissed by Imperial orders and sub-
ordinated to the governor of Kwantung. In August, 1903, how-
ever, new administrative arrangements were made; by which the Kwan
tung territory was combined with the Amur Province to be formed in
to a special viceroyalty. This existed until the Russo-Japanese
ar
.
Provisions of Treaty with respect to Kwantung.
In spite of a few differnces, the provisions of the treaty with
respect to the lease of Kwantung bear general resemblance to the
provisions of the German lease. The provisions of military, naval
and civil administration within the leased territory, and the pro-
visions of the relations between China and Russia within the neu-
same
tral zone are materially the as those concluded between China and
Germany. Differences, however, are found in some places. First,
should any criminal cases occur, the Chinese criminal is to be
handed over fco the nearest Chinese officials to be punished while
in Kiao Chow, some special cases are subjected to German jurisdic-
tion. Second, j Port Arthur, unlike Kiao Chow, is solely a naval
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port, only Russian and Chinese vessels are to be allowed to use
itjwhi e alienwan, with the exception of a part .within the
port which, like Port Arthur, is to be reserved for the use of
Russian and Chinese men-of-war
, is to continue to be a trading
port, where the merci ant- vessels of all countries can freely come
and go. Third , railway concessions are explicitly inserted in-
to the treaty while in the case of Kiao Chow they are only arranged
by agreement. In addition to the provisions for the construction
of the extended line from a point on the Chinese Eastern Railway
1
to Talienwan, the agreement of September 8,1896 concluded between
China and the Russo - Chinese Bank shall be strictly applied. This
provision is significant both for commercial and strategical rea-
sons. Among other things the agreement provides that goods import-
ed from Russia into China by rail and exported from China to Russia
in the same manner, shall pay respectively an import or export duty
to the extent of one -third less as compared with the duty imposed
at Chinese seaport customs houses. This was originally intended
to develop the commerce between Chiaa and Russia; as applied to
Talienwan, it was also conducive to the development of Russian corn-
eighth
merce in that port. But worst cf all is the ^ section which pro-
vides that the preservation of order and decorum on the land as-
signed to the railway and its appurtenances shall be confidec to
police agents appointed by the company and the company shall, for
this purpose, draw up and establish police regulations. The ap-
plication of these two provisions would make Russia to be both
commercial and military master in the leased territory and the
1. A full text of the Russo -Manchuriah agreement Railway is
found in Weale's" The Reshaping of the Far East", vol.2, p. 444.
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n
vicinity surrounding the railway line and its braches. Four), , .
in Article V. of an additional amendment between China and Russia,
1
which was concluded on May 7, of the same year provides that with-
out Russia's consent no road and minin L concessions shall be made
in the neutral territory while in Kiao Chow, this is extended to
the whole province of Shangtung. Further, without Russia's consent
use
no concession will be granted in the neutral ground for the of sub-
jects of other powers. This is not found in the treaty relating to
Kiao Chow, finally, the term is fixed at 25 years instead of 99
years as it is in the case in Kiao Chow. Unlike the Kiao Chow trea-
of the leased territory
ty, there is no provision for the return^before^xpiration of the
term but for an extension after expiration by mutual agreemant.
Talienwan under Russian Rule.
As has been pointed out, part of this port was opened to
trade according to treaty provision. Although Russia put more
emphasis on military and political undertakings in the territory
of Kwantung, she, however, did not neglect its commecial import-
ance. It was M. Witte's plan to create Talienwan as the commer-
cial terminus of the gr^at Siberian Railway, and eventually the
mere antile outlet on the Pacific of the vrst Russian Empire. This
is evidenced by the fact that before the Russ 6-Japanese War, the
works at Dalny( Talienwan ), including its large docks and piers
^
1
had cost already nearly 20,000,000 rubles.
During the Russian period, Talienwan was an open port, so there
was no accurate data to show its commercial growth. The trade of
1. The equivalent of a ruble in American dollar is about fifty
one cents.
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of Russia with Manchuria may, however, give a little idea about
the trade condition in Talienwan :
Date Trade value in rubles
1900 56,000,000
1901 51,000,000
1903 38,000,000
From the above figures, we learn that the Russian trade in
Manchuria appeared to be growing smaller. , But this decline
was due to the withdrawal of military traffic rather than due
to the Russian method of conducting business. When Russia leased
the territory, and opened Dalny as a free port, she did her best
tion
to promote her commerce there. By discrimination in transporta/\
rates, and by preventing the collection of customs duties at Dalny,
she attempted to divert to that port, where her own merchants were
established, the trade formerly belonging to Newchwang which was
the base of the commerce carried°
n
in Manchuria by other nations.
A
She also took measures to increase her own imports to the Manchu-
rian provinces. Fourteen steamers, subsidized to the amount of
1
$ 309,000 annually were put in operation between European Russia,
and Vladivostok, Port Arthur and Dalny. The system of advancing
to Chinese merchants by the Ruseo- Chinese Bank
.
together with
imports free of duty and favorable rates in export duties, had led
Mr. Miller, the American consul, to urge that these were likely to
enable Russian cotton to capture the great trade of Manchuria that
2
was now largely in the hands of American manufacturers. These con-
ditions and other political considerations had caused the United
States to demand in 1903 the opening of Mukden and Antung to inter-
1. U. S. Consular Reports, vol. 73, p. 40.
2. Commercial China, 1904, p. 2383.
3. Directory and Chronicle for China, p. 813-15 ; China Year
Book, 1914, p. 120.
-"V
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o
national residence and trade, and caused Japan with the support
of England and the United States to demand the opening of Tatunr-
kao for the same purpose in order to weaken Russia's influerice.
It might be well, in this connection, to say a few words about
American trade with Manchuria during this period. Manchuria, dt
this time, imported more goods from the United States than from any
other foreign country, an. American imports at Newchwang between
1900-1904 amounted to about $ 5,000,000 annually. In 1901, out
of a total of $ 24,813,692 native and foreign imports at Neucluvang,
$ 14,660,000 represented cotton goods, and of this about one- third
was American piece goods. In 1902, about thirty - five per cent
of the total foreign imports at Newchwang came from the United
States, and the greater part of this was cotton goods. In 1903,
the total foreign imports were $ 13,314,012, and America's share
was $ 5,562,255, of which t 4,873,960 was cotton goods. These fi-
gures will suffice to show the position held by the United States
in former years in regard to the most important import of Manchu-
ria. The Russians were able to produce cotton fabrics almost as
good as the American goods, but the 5,000 miles trans- Siberian
freight was twice as expensive as the pacific transportation. So
by far the greater part of sheetings, drills, and jeans came from
America. However, the prosperity only belonged to cotton goods.
As to kerosene oil and wheat flour we find a steady decrease sin-
ce the Russian lease of Kwantung. The importation of American
kerosene at Newchwang fell from 3,172,000 gallons in 1901 to 603,
180 gallons in 1902; and American flour was almost driven from the
market by the Russian mills at Harbin. But these articles made up
1. Annals of the American Academy, vol. 39-40, p. 157.
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only a email part of the total trade, so it might be safe to say
that during this period American trarle condition* in Manchuria were
very satisfactory in spite of the aggressive policy which the Rus-
sians f .^1 loved
Por t Arthur unde r_
t
he Russian Rule.
Port Arthur was the naval base as distinguiehed from Talienwan
which was devoted mainly to trade. Russia refortified this port
and made it into a great naval and military stronghold. From the
time of the lease up to the Rue so - Japanese War, fifty nine per-
manent forts, including euch famous forts as the 203- Metre Hill,
Erlingehan and Signal Hill were built; 546 guns, including 54 of
large calibre, were mounted; 5 great battleships, 14 gunboats, and
some 50 sail vessels were placed in thie harbor. These actual un-
dertakings have already shown to us how tremenduous an energy Rus-
sia had put in^?he building up of Port Arthur.
Railway Concession under the Russian Lease
.
The treaty provided that Russia was allowed to extend the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway to Talienwan. In order to understand the im-
portance of thie extension, it might be well to say a word about
the original Chinese Eastern Railway. The construction of this
railway together with the privilege of exploitation was conceded
1
to the Rueso- Chinese Bank in 1896. The main line begins at a
runs
point on the trans- Siberian Railway, Manchowli, via Harbin, and
A
ends at Suifengho, the point of continuation of the trans- Sibe-
rian Railway to Vladivostok making a total of 921 miles. The ex-
1. China's Year Book, 1914, p. 211 and p. 234.
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tension starting from Harbin, consists of 608 miles of which 439
miles from Changchuen to Port Arthur are later known as the oouth
Manchurian Railway after having been transferred to Japan. It was
stipulated in the orginal agreement that the line was to be the
property of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company for eighty years
u on the expiration of which time it reverted to China without cost.
It also provided for the purchase of the line in 36 years after it
was put in operation at a price representing the cost of the line
and interest. These provisions apply Lo the extension line.
The construction of the line was pushed ahead rapidly and by the
beginning of the Boxer outbreak, with the exception of a number of
bridges, it was practically finished. During the Boxer trouble
much of the line was destroyed and especially the extension which
is between Port Arthur and Harbin. The work was, however, renewed
with vigor and in the fall of 1901, the Chinese Eastern Railway to-
gether with the extension ?/as completed. The entire system cost
$ 150,000,000 out of which suram $ 55,000,000 were used in the con-
struction of the extension line. This is exclusive of the 250,
000,000 rubles spent in the building up of Port Arthur, Dalny and
Harbin, and other enterprises outside the strictly railway expendi-
tures •
This railway is of utmost importance. It connects Kwantung with
Manchuli, Vladivostok, Harbin, the so'called Moscow of China,
then to Saint Petersburg by way of the trans- Siberian Railway, and
finally with Peking through the Peking -Mukden Railway. An article
in the Far Eastern Review for May, 1909 says, " This was the link
which was to bind the Pacific litoral wdith the great trans- Si-
berian Railway, through Chinese territory in northern Manchuria,
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thus avoiding the greater task of following the crooked Amur River
in the endeavor to seek an outlet to the sea. At the same time, it
created a new line of attack and approach to the goal of Pekirg."
So not only the roint of regent oword ( Port Arthur ) was under its
influence hut the whole of Manchuria and the National Capilo 1 was
at stake.
the
And finally, the building of railv»ay carried with it the right
A
of mining in regions both along the railway and independent of the
railway, and also the privilege of guarding the railway. The cost
of policing the railway alone had been 24,000,000 rubles, or $12,
000,000, Policemen were soldiers and soldiers were policemen. This
military police force along the railway had been found to be most
effective in carrying out Russia's underhanded plan.
The Russo-Japanese Conflict .
It was unfortunate for Russia that she was not the only one
who looked toward Kwantung. Her plan was magnificent but her ad-
versary was also pressing. The fact that Russia took an active
part in the retrocession of Liaotung Peninsula to China and again
tried to lease it from China for herself was a thing that Japan
never forgot.
For
,
Japan's expansion into the said territory was more natural
and more urgent than Russia's. Her population since 1828 up to the
Russo-Japanese War had been almost doubled. In 1828, Japan had only
a population of 27,000,000 ; in 1875, of 34,000,000 and in 1904, of
1
47,000,000. The growth of popalat ion is one of the most impor-
tant factors that caused Japan's expansion to conflict with Russian
1. KAsakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 2. Accopdirig to
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interests
.
Further, the development of Japan seemed to lie in the direction
of industry and trade rather than of agriculture. Less than 13,000,
000 acres of land or 1Z>% of the extent of whole country were under
cultivation at that time while the arable area of the land cannot
be possibly increased by more than lo, 500,900 acres. It is evident
that the per capita share of the arable land is even less than the
corresponding rate Ir England and less than half of that in China.
The tenants live from hand to mouth and cannot always afford even
the necessary fertilizers and the proprietor's profit hardly rises
above b% while the capital employed pays an interest of 15$ %o
30/-. This condition has directed the Japanese mainly into commer-
cial channels. So her trade with foreign countries increased from
49,742,831 yen in 1873 to 606,637,959 yen in 1903. Manbhuria was
then considered by far the most important place for her commercial
expansion; in order for the Japanese trade to flourish in the Man-
churian market, it was thought very desirable to have control of its
gate -way
.
Finally, the Japanese have fed themselves with the same national
as
delusion
N
have other ambitious nations . They believe that in or-
der to become a gr at power they must not hesitate to seize terri-
tory at the expense of others. They believe that the greatness of
Japan must lie in her domination over the Continent. Imperialism
means Continentalism and Continantalism must be acomplished by Mili-
tarism.
1910, the Japanese population has increased up to 50,984,000. Dur-
ing +he six years between 1904 to 1910 Tanan's annual increase in
population has been seven-tenth\ millions
.
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These urgent factors together with the intolerable aggression
of Russia in Korea and in P/'anchuria rendered a war inevitable. . a-
pan seemed to be silent at the retrocession of Liaotung but her
long preparation for the . ar wa too obvious if we examine the fol-
lowing budget ;
Date Total expenditure Military expenditure %
yen yen
1894-5 78,128,000 20,662,000 26.4
1895-6 85,317,000 23,536,000 27.6
1896-7 168,856,000 73,248,000 43.4
1897-8 223,678,000 110,542,000 49.3
1898-9 219,757,000 112,427,000 51.1
1699-0 254,165,000 114,212,000 44.9
19C0-1 292,750,000 133,113,000 45.4
1901-2 266,856,000 102,360,000 38.3
1902-3 289,226,000 85,768,000 29.7
1903-4 244,752,000 71,368,000 31.7
1904-5 223,181,000 69,433,000 31.1
From the above table we notice the sudden increase in Japan's
army and navy expenditure after 1896 ; we notice that from 1896
to 1905 the army and navy covers an average of 40$ of the total
expenditure. She prepared for the war for nine years. She prepared
for the war because she thought war was the only means which would
enable her to get control over Kwantung-- the gate way to Manchu-
ria and eventually the gate way to her Continental Policy, on the
other hand, an ice free port such as Port Arthur and Talienwan linked
with her vast empire was considered as an absolute necessity for
Russian expansion. So both nations had vital interests at stake;
both nations were fully prepared foi a struggle
,
and both na-
tions believed that the settlement of this dispute could be found
only in war. This began on the night of February 8,1904.
Transfer of Kwantung to . apan .
It is not the scope of this paper to discuss the war between
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Japan and Russia. In a word, the //ar has settled the dispute over
this territory and other things at least for the time being. By
the treaty of Portmouth, Russia agreed, among other things, to tran
the
sfer Kwantung and railway and mining rights to Japan, provided that
China would consent thereto. A conference was called between Japan
and China subsequently. Although no outward friction developed at
the conferences, it was well known that China acceded to the treaty
with great reluctance, especially in the matter of the transfer of
Kwantung to Japan. China would have preferred to have rescinded
this obnoxious lease together. But she was not successful and a
1
treaty between China and Japan was concluded on December 22,1905,
whereby the Chinese Imperial government consented to all transfers
and assignments by Russia to Japan by articles V and VI of the
2
treaty of peace.
Government of Kwantung under Japan .
According to the Japanese Imperial Ordinances relating to the
government of Kwantung and offices subordinat
A
to it, issued cn Sep-
ship
tember 1, 1906, the Governor General is to be filled with either a
Lieutenant - General or full General with the highest official ranks
accorded to him. The Governor General governs Kwantung Province,
the
and has command of ^troops under him and directs administration, sub
ject to the supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Go-
a
vennor General is authorized under special c&mmission to conduct
* he
negotiations with the Chinese local authorities; shall receive the
1. Hertslets, China Treaties, vol. 1, p. 392.
2. Ibid, p. 610. Article V refers
to the transfer of the lease of Kwantung; article VI refers to the
transfer of the Changchun- Port Arthur Railway and of coal mines.
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instructions of the Minister of .Var and of the chief of the General
Staff and of the inspector General of Military Education in matters
relative to the military administration and personnel.
Port Arthur after the Transfer .
The importance of this port as a military and naval base has
been touched upon in former paragraphs. Riojun, as the Japanese call
it, is now the headquarters of the Japanese civil and military ad-
ministration in the province of Kwantung. The town is divided into
two parts, the old, the new. The forts and harbors built by the
Russians are repaired and more fully and adequately equipped. On
1
July 1, 1910, the western harbor was thrown open to the ships of
all nations with a view to fostering international trade^or better
to fostering Japanese trade. By the opening of the Dairen-Port
Arthur Branch Railway, the journey between these two ports occupies
only one hour and a half by train. This will allow the military
authority at Port Arthur more readily to exert influence in helping
to promote Japanese trade at Dairen.
Dairen after the Transfer .
The name Dairen itself begins with the transfer . This port
was formerly called Talienwan and Dalny. The most distinguished
feature that characterizes Dairen as soon as the transfer was made
was the fact that Japan uses her governmental and military control
of the place to get everything worth having while her regulations
kept competitors out, The purpose of the government respecting
trade in Kwantung and Manchuria as printed in newspapers, is sum-
1. Directory and Chronicle for- China, p. 818.
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1
raed up by Mr. Millard in four articles, as follows:
Article 1.-- The government to guarantee a loan of yen 6,000,
000 at 4;.', to be advanced to Japanese merchants doing business in
Manchuria ( including Kwantung ), to assist them in establishing
a trade for Japanese goods.
Article 2.-- The Japanese goods destined for Manchuria to be
delivered upon credit under certain limitations.
Article 3.-- The South Manchurian Railway Company to carry such
goods free, or at one half the usual rate, for one year.
Article 4.-- Maritime freightage in Japanese ships aarrying Ja-
panese goods to Manchuria to be free, or at one half the usual rate,
for one year.
Mr. Millard further says that no duties are being charged on Ja-
panese goods imported from Japan,
This sharp discrimination, however, did not last very long be-
cause it led the Diplomatic Corps at Peking to urge that steps
be taken to have the Chinese Customs House established at Dairen
which has formed a customs district under the Chinese Imperial Port
2
since July 1, 1907, with arrangements the same as those at Kiao
3
Chow. Dairen is the chief customs district but it is not the only
customs district in Kwantung. It has outstations at Kinchow, Pulan-
tien, Pitzemo, and Port Arthur.
Dairen is recognized as the most rapidly growing port in modern
it
China, andAis worth while to notice its volume of trade during re-
1. Millard, America and the Far Eastern Questions, p. 191.
2. China's Year Book, J914, p. 120.
3. See Chapter II. This arrangement has removed the taiifX.' dis
crimination at Dairen but Japanese products which reach Korea thru
Gensan are brought into Manchuria by way of Chientao without duty
being paid although this route is more expensive.
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cent years.
Date Imports in hk.tls. Exports in hk.tls.
1908 17,215,936 7,342,402
1909 12,239,563 22,318,144
1910 18,671,515 20,183,290
1911 24,012,724 24,184,154
From the above table, we learn that the trade at Dalren is ex-
ceedingly prosperous. But the prosperity belongs to only one
nation. Although Germany, Great Britain and Belgium have shown a
little increase in their trade at Dairen, all the rest have suffer
ed severely, and worst of all is the trade condition of the United
States iH this territory. A glance at the following table will
1
give us some idea of the situation.
Date Imports from Japan Imports from U. S.
1908 10,155,417 5,599,186
1909 10,354,275 81,272
1910 13,471,160 464,338
1911 18,442,938 291,540
1912 18,486,000
1913 20,024,000
During the period from 1908 up to 1911 Kwantung's imports from
Japan has nearly doubled while that from the United States has de-
creased over 93 per cait. It is curious to notice that in spite of
2
the temporary decline in the total imports to Kwantung in 1909 Ja-
pan's imports to this territory showed an increase of two hundred
thousand hk.tls. In 1911 more than three-fourthSof the total im-
ports and exports were in the hand of the Japanese. It is true
that cheaper labor, cheaper cost of production and cheaper rate of
1. Berichte, Deutsches Handels, Archiv 1912, part 2, p. 642.
2. See the first table 6f this page.
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transportation have ma:ie the situation more favorable to Japan yet
Mr. Vieale is justified in saying that Manchuria is practically a
closed market .\hen we consider discrimination in rates of railway
transportation and the delay of fixing trains for goods other than
Japanese
.
A Study of the Population in Kwantung and Manchuria *
From the year 1908 to 1913, a period of six years, the number
of Japanese in South Manchuria has nearly doubled. This overwhelm-
ing immigration is not only a matter of natural movement but al-
deve loped
so a policy by conscious efforts. The Japanese population in Man-
N 1
churia is seen in the following table :
Date Number of Japanese
1908 46,942
1909 53,906
1910 62,338
1912 73,568
1913 82,978
According to the census of 1913, these Japanese immigrants are
2
distributed among the following places in Manchuria :
Location Mumber of Japanese
Kwantung 47 , 162
Mukden 13,969
Changchun 6,208
Antung 6,878
Newchwang 6,358
Harbin 1,413
Kirin & Tsi- 990
tsihar
1. Japan Year Book, 1914, p.713 and p. 39.
2. Ibid, p. 38.
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The situation will be more clearly perceived when we make a
comparison of the Chinese and Japanese population in Dairen and
Port Arthur, the two principal cities in Kwantung. This compari-
1
son is here presented :
Japanese Chinese
Dairen 29,395 20,338
Port Arthur 9,637 8,222
The writer has not found any other place in China where the
aliens exceed the native^, except Port Arthur, Dairen, and Harbin
where the Russians have the majority.
This constant pouring in of Japanese population has both eco-
nomical and political ends in view but its effects do not stop
here, and its influence tends to be detrimental to the already exi-
sting moral order. An English missionary , is quoted by Mr. Millard
2
as saying, " I am very much disappointed at some results of the
Japanese immigration and the presence of thousands of Ja-
panese men of low character and immoral women who openly ply their
?
avocation in the streets of cities and towns, are corruting influ-
ences new to the country, or only felt before in a limited degree"
However, it must be admitted that such a statement is by no means
true in all cas e^ and many: of the Japanese immigrants are satisfac-
tory at least so far as private life is concerned.
Finance in Kwantung.
The financial condition in Kwantung is very misleading at the
first glance at the budget. The budget excludes military expenses
1. Japan Year Book, 1914, p. 713.
2. Millard, America and the Ear Eastern Question, p. 222.
-I
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on the one hand and the profit of the South Manchurian Railway
Company on the other, which two items must be taken into consi-
deration if we wish to have a clear idea of the financial condi-
1
tion in Kwantung.
The ordinary revenue of Kwantung is drawn from taxes, public
undertakings, state property, revenue stamps and miscellaneous re-
ceipts. Public undertaking and state property form the greatest
ttems in ordinary revenue, which are estimated to be 1,626,000
yen or more than four-fif thS of the total ordinary revenue in the
budget of 1914- 1915. The extraordinary revenue consists mainly
proceeds from the
of the .sale of state property and of appropriation^ from the cen-
tral treasury. The first consists largely of lands transferred
by the Russians and bought from the Chinese. The total extent
of land ( in Manchuria as well as in Kwantung ), belonging to the
South Manchurian Railway Company is 70.54 square miles or 45,156
acres. So far as public land in Kwantung is concerned, its annual
sale is given as follows :
Date Value
yen
1908-09 1,200
1909- 10 1,200
1910- 11 17,616
1911- 12 18,000
1912- 13 777,000
1913014 10,000
1914-15 26,000
The annual Home Treasury subvention has been from 2,307,000
yen to 3,964,000 yen. The total revenue according to the budget
of 1914-1915 is 4,437,000 yen.
1. Japan Year Book, 1908-09, p .573; 1910, p. 633; 1912, p. 662;
1913, p. 683; 1914, p. 714.
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>ith regard to expenditure, the largest items in the budget
of 1914-1915 are communication expenses, being 1,050,000 yen, po-
lice and prison expenses, being 910,000 yen, etc. These make a
total expenditure of 4,437,000 yen.
The point the writer wanti- to get at is that the 4,437,000 re-
venue against the 4,437,000 yen expenditure does not represent
the true financial condition here.
In regard to expenditure, the navy in Kwantung and Mancurian
K
waters in 1913-1914 costs 966,000 yen and the garrison in said re-
gions cost Japan 4,660,000 yen. An expenditure of 5,500,000 yen
a as
is not So small sum to be neglected.
* A for
The 5,566,000 yen military expenses, being entirely supported
by the government, together with the Home Treasury subvention of
the same year (1913-1914 ), makes a total expenditure of 8,674,000
yen. Now Japan is not a rich country. How can she do this year
after year ? She has no capital at hand but she has a machine to
manufacture it. She has a South Manchurian Railway Company. This
company yields in the fiscal year of 1913-1914 a net profit of
7,167,000 yen. This sum has practically covered all the expenses
which Japan has incurred in Kwantung and Manchuria, and it is be-
lieved that this company will j^ield an ever>Jncreasing profit to
offset governmental expenditures, It is true that the profits are
distributed not wholly in the payment of dividends to government
shares but one must confess that the company is run by the govern-
ment, its officials are appointed by the government and its pro-
fits must be dealt with as a part of national finance rather than
a private gain. It is further true that the garrison and navy in
Manchurian waters are not solely for the protection of Kwantung^
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and the South Manchurian Railway Company manages things not only
in Kwantung but also in the entire South Manchuria ; but the si-
tuation is such that Japan's manipulation in Manchuria is for
Kwantung , and that in Kwantung is for Manchuria; the financial
conditions in the two being so intermingled together and so com-
plex that it is absolutely impossible to treat the one without
taking the other into consideration. So the actual finance in
Kwantung and Manchuria is shown in the following table :
I Receipts
Date
1907-08
1908909
1909- 10
1910- 11
1911- 12
1912- 13
1913- 14
1914- 15
Date
1907-08
1908-09
1909- 10
1910- 11
1911- 12
1912- 13
1913- 14
1914- 15
General revenue
yen
4,386,000
4,653,602
4,879,489
4,867,988
4,984,926
5,246,000
5,739,000
4,437,000
Subvention
yen
i,000,000
i, 120.000
»j
'j
;
j
3,122,000
3,047,000
2,307,000
of S,M.R.Co.
3 ,
3,964,000
3,615,000
>, 643,000
i. .
Net profit
yen
1,087,988
7,375,734
7,161,000
4,928,000
4,926,000
7,167,000
II Expenditure.
Gsr.,eral Expenditure
yen
4,386,293
4,653,802
4,879,489
4,867,988
4,984,926
5,246,000
5,697,000
4,437,000
Garrison Exp.
yen
5,713,000
5,296,000
5,009,000
4,497,000
4,660,000
Navy expenditure,
yen
1,115,000
1,091,000
1,167,000
1,095,000
966,000
The South Manchurian Railway Company.
After the South Manchurian Railway between uhangchuen, Dairen,
and Port Arthur had been transferred to the Japanese government
1
by Russia with the consent of China, a company named ::inami Man-
1. The transfer took place on August 1, 1906 .
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shu Tetsudo or South Manchurian Railway Company was organized by
an Imperial decree to operate this line. By June 1906, the esta-
blishment of this company was formally announced. The organization
Coramitee held its first meeting on August 10,1906. It was then
considered as a private company of a special character but on april
1, 1907, the Field Railway Office formally transferred the railways
and all belonging to the company. The control of the railways was
transferred to the Minister of Communications in July 1908, and
subsequentlyto the Imperial RaiJ/ay Board.
With respect to the distribution of shares, the Organization
Committee, during the first meeting of 1906, decided that the com-
pany should be capitalized at 200,000,000 yen, the government to
receive 100,000,000 yen in shares for (1) railways already con-
1 2
structed, (2) all properties accesory to the ahove railways and
3
(3) coal mines at Fushan and Yentai. The remaining shares were
offered to Japanese and Chinese objects. The Chinese, however,
4
failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to purchase shares.
The company raised a loan of 8,000,000 L in 1908 in Europe, and
the capital actually paid in by the share holders was only 2,000,
ooo yen. In January 1911, foreign loan of 60,000,000 yen was float-
ed in London, 20,000,000 yen to repay the short term loan , and the
5
rest for reconstructing the Antung-Mukden Railway. It is curious
to notice how Japan works her way by the utilization of
foreign capital. For the investment, the government further gua-
1. Excluding the railway stock now in use, rails of the Mukden
light railway and accessories.
2. Excluding the property in the leased territory.
3. The Far Eastern Review, 1909, Nov. No., p. 288.
4. Ibid, p. 289.
5. Japan Year Book, 1912, p. 664.
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1
ranteeSthe profit of 6%.
Such is the history and the capitalization of the South Manchu-
rian Railway Company. But is it only a railway company ?
In its administrative system, we find that the government re-
serves the right of appointing members of the administrative body,
except the auditors who are elected for three years at the general
meeting of shareholders. The term of the president and vice pre-
sident is five years, that of directors is four . Although the go-
vernment must select them from among shareholdei-s of at least 50
shares yet beyond this limitation, the government has sole control
over its administration. So viewed from its relations to the cen-
tral government, the company is not only a business corporation
but also a governmental agent.
With respect to the fuctions the company performs, the company
controls not only the railways but all sorts of business. It en-
gages in mining, in marine transport, in harbor business, in ware-
houses, electric and gas worked . It sells on consignment the prin-
cipal goods carried by rail. It controls the construction and admi-
nistration of land and houses on the land belonging to the railways
It is empowered to make the necessary provisions for education,
health, and engineering works within the limits of the land belong-
ing to the railways. It is also entrusted to collect fees from the
inhabitants within this region to defray expenses of above. So,
from its tKue nature and scope, the company is not only a railway
company but also a colonial administrator. Besides the policing
power which is under the supervision of the Kwantung government,
1. Japan Year Book, 1912, p. 669.
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and the judicial power which belongs to the Consul, within this
region, the South Manchurian Company is able to do anything.
Japanese Railways with in and in connection with Kwantung .
Japanese railways within and in connection with Kwantung under
the direct control of the South Manchurian Company consists of two
lines: (1) the Changchuen-Dairen line and its branches which have
been trarferred by Russia, and (2) the Antung-Mukden Railway of
which th$ right of control has been given by the agreement between
China and Japan. Besides these, there are two other other lines,
the
named
A
Changchuen- Kirin Railway and the Simmintun-Mukden Railway
of which half of the capital is borrowed from Japan but the control
is vested in the hand of the Chinese.
At the end of 1913, other attempts had been made by Japan for
the construction of a network of railways in South Manchuria.
The Changchuen- Dairen line, being transferred by Russia, con-
sists of 439-jr miles. It opened to traffic in 1907. Besides this
439-| miles, it has many branches : one branch knov/n as the Suchia-
tun-Fushan Collieries, consists of 34^ miles; the second branch,
Tashikiao-Yinkow, 13^ miles, and finally, the Choushuitze-Port Ar-
thur line, 3l| miles. These are all of standard guage. The adraini
stration of this main line and its branches is based on the origi-
nal agreement between China and the Russo- Chinese Bank, concluded
in 1896. It is to be the property of the South Manchurian Rail-
4
way Company for the remaning years of the eighty years, dated from
K
the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, upon the expiration
of which time it revert® to China without cost. If China should
wish to purchase the line before its expiration, she can do so af-
ter the line has been put into operation for 36 years by paying a
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price representing the cost of the line and interest.
The Antung-Mukden Railway came into existence to meet the exi-
gences of the Russo-Japanese War, and was therefore hurriedly con-
structed. Subsequently, under article VI of the additional agree-
1
ment between Japan and China dated December 22, 1905, Japan as
given the privilege of improving and operating the Antung-Mukden
line for a period of 15 years from the date of the agreement ,after
which the ohinese government acquired the right to pu .'Chase the
line at the price determined by valuation and arbitration. The
s
Japanese, however, contrue improvement as reconstruction, and pro-
ed
ceedAto relocate the line, and change its gauge. This is both a
the
violation of agreement and a blow at the Open Door Doctrine. Mr.
Rea says, " It is significant that not one official protest was
raised by any of the powers against Japan's move, The two powers
professing the greatest adherence to the Open Door Doctrine, Great
Britain and America, were conspicuous by their silence and aparent
2
acquiecence in Japan's action."
ing
This line^ consist^ of 162 miles, was formerly under the control
of the military authorities until its transfer to the South Manchu-
rian Railway Company, in December of 1906. It was opened to traffic
3
in August 1908. Its conversion into broad gaaa.ge w?s completed by
November 11,1908.
These two lines with branches constitute a total millage of 701
miles. They traverse one of the richest areas in the world. Their
connections with Korea, oiberia, and North China have made Japan
the master of the situation.
1. hertslets, uhina Treaties, vol. 1, p. 395.
2. The Far Eastern Review, Nov. 1909, p. 295.
3. Ibid, p. 296.
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In this connection, . it might be well to say a word about the
attitude which the United States took toward these railways and
the Russian system in Manchuria. Since the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way and the South Manchurian Railway furnish the gravest danger
of future conflict, the United States in 1910, undertook to pro-
pose the neutralization of these two systems. But the plan failed
to be carried through because both Japan and ittissia strongly ob-
el
jectA.to it.
The third and fourth lines left for our discussion are the
Changchuen-Kirin Railway and the Sinmintun-Mukden Railway. The
Changchuen-Kirin Railway is 80 miles long. These two lines are
under the direct control of the Chinese government, but owing to
the Japanese influence over them, some thing must be said if we
wish to have a clear idea of the situation.
Prior to 1907, the Sinmintun-Mukden Railway was run by the Ja-
panese, As this line forms a part of the Peking-Mukden Railway,
it is of vital importance if China herself could have control over
1
it. So by the treaty of April 15, 1907, the Chinese government
purchased the Sinmintun-Mukden Railway by paying 1,990,000 yen,
and on the following conditions:
1. The Chinese government in constructing the railway east of
Liao ( part of the Sinmintun Mukden line ), and the railway be-
tween Chanfchuen and Kirin, shall borrow half of the funds from
the South Manchurian Railway Company. The term of redemption of
the loan shall be 18 years with regard to the loan relating to
Sinmintun-Mukden Railway east of the Liao, and 25 years with re-
1. Hertslets, China Treaties, vol. 1, p. 397.
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1
gard to the loan relating to the Kirin-Changchuen Railway,
2. With respect to the future extension of the Changchuen-
China
Kirin Railway, in case of lacking fund§ Japan shall he askedA
for the loan unless China can construct on her own account; thus
eliminating all other countries to compete with Japan,
3. During the term of loan, Japanese shall he engaged as chief
engineers and railway accountants.
4. Receipts of the ahove railways shall be deposited with Ja-
panese Banks.
5. Both the Sinraintun-Mukden and Kirin- °hangchuen Railways
to be constructed by China shall be connected with the ^outh Man-
churian Railway.
Mining in Manchur ia.
Next in importance to railways is the privilege of mining. It
is not only advantageous for its annual profit but also for its
being a basis of a sphere of influence.
2
The Fushan Collieries «t situated about 22 miles east of Mukden
and contain deposits from 80 to 175 feet in thickness. The sto-
rage is estimated to be at least 800 million tons. Seven pits are
now in operation with the total daily output of 3,000 ^ ons.
The Yentai coal fields exist north of Liaoyang and can be reach-
ed in an hour by rail from the Yentai station. The daily output
is 100 tons.
The annual estimate of coal production of these two mines is
as follows:
1. The terra begins with the date of opening, i.e. Oct. 20, 1912.
2. Japan Year Book, 1913, p. 688; 1914, p. 716.
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Date Output
tons
Net profit
yen
1911
1912
1913
1,382,000
1,513,000
2,281,000
2,628,000
1,846,000
1,800,000
In order to facilate transportation, two branches of railways
have "been built to connect these coal fields with the South Man-
churian Railway. The Fushan branch consists of 38.9 miles and
the Yentai branch, 9.7 miles. Both branches opened in 1908.
It is true that Japan gains Influence in Manchuria at the ex-
pense of Russia. But did Russia's influence disappear with the
war ? Did Russia ever forget the war ? In fact Russia's influ-
ence is still felt in two- thirds of Manchuria, including the entire
northern watershed, embracing the region drained by the Sungari
and its tributaries; she controls jointly with Manchuria the migh-
ty Amur; she has a fortified sea port in Vladivostok connected
with Siberia and European Russia by the Manchurian and the trans-
Siberian Railways; her hold in Mongolia is not materially weaken-
ed; while behind it and beyond it always stands her massive em-
pire. Her position in Manchuria is defined by the Portmouth trea-
ty and, in an international sense, is identical with Japan. The
northern railways are policed by Russian guards. Russian garrison
appfound at Tsitsihar, Mongar, Aigun, Sangsan, Urga and several
X
other places near to Manchuria. Although her grip is not so tight
as the Japanese, her immigration into Manchuria, after the war up
to 1908, has been trebled* being 180,000 in 1906, 400,000 in 1907,
and 500,000 in 1908. She owns 8 flour mills in Manchuria with a
total daily output of 47,000 poods. Everything has been done for
A
Russia in Manchuria after the War of 1904.
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1
military provision and unexpected emergencies. Certainly ahe
has not forgotten the humiliating result of the war of 1904,
too not to note
Japan ^has^neglec ted^that Russia has not abandoned her secret plan
of revanche . So with Mr. Millard, " A greater Japan will mean the
knell of Russia's Easter^ Policy; a greater Russia in the East may
make impossible Japan's eventual supremacy there. Between the two
a greater China will solve the question itself by maintain-
2
ing international equilibrium in the Far East."
1. Russian flour mills in Manchuria are given as follows;
Location. Daily output in poods.
Sungari
Zozulingsky
Manchu
Druzen
Riff
Nowalski
Turkim
Klondineff
10,000
7,000
6,000
2,000
3,000
7,000
10,000
1,000

CHAPTER IV
KWANG CHOW WAN.
Kwang Chow Wan ( or according to the French official spelling,
Kouang- tcheou-wan ), the French leased territory, is situated at
a distance of 230 miles of Hong Kong, W. S. W. on the coast of the
1
province of Hwangtung. It comprises an area of 190 square miles.
2
This includes the two islands which were added to it in 1899.
The treaty was signed between China and France on 27th May, 1898,
and is materially the same as the German treaty of Kiao Chow.
Government of Kwang Chow Wan.
Fallowing the convention of delimitation signed on the 16th of
November, 1899, between Marshal Sou and Admiral Courre jolles, the
territory of Kwang Chow Wan was placed under the authority of the
4
Governor-General of Indo China. The territory has been divided
into three administrative circumscriptions, but the Chinese com-
5
munal organization is maintained.
L. Directory and Chronicle for China, 1914, pp.1082.
2. Stateman's Year Book, 1906, pp.877.
3. Hertsl^s,' China Treaties, pp.328.
4. French Indo China consists of five states: Anam, Cambodia
Cochin China, Tonkin and Laos. The whole country is under a gov-
ernor General, assisted by a Secretary c-eneral and each of the state »
has^its head a functionary, called Resident Suppior except in
Cochin China which has a governor at its head. '
5. Stateman's Year Book, 1914, pp.851.

Fort Bayard
.
s,s_ a ?9*±
The chief plao of the erritory is the town of Fort Bayard,
which is at the entrance of the interior port on the right bank
of the river Ma Teche. It is the commercial centre of this leased
territory. Kwang Chow wan is understood to be a free port in which
all commercial operations can be carried on without paying any
duty. "Governor Dourner has expressed the hope that the absence
of customs duties and the entire liberty allowed to ships of com-
merce will tend to make it soon one of the principal entrepots
1
of the Far East." Commerce has already largely extended. In
1912, the imports and exports of Kwang Chow wan was estimated to
2
be 8,412,875 Piasters, or $3, 600,000.
Kwang Chow Wan as a Naval Base.
The two islands of liaochow and Tanghai placed at the entrance
of the bay make am excellent closed port into which entrance is
by two narrow passages. Mr, Morse says, "The Bay has a good
3 !
anchorage, but with a difficult entrance through sandy banks."
Barracks are built on river Ma Teche. On the whole, Kwang Chow Wan
is the least valuable naval base among the five.
Finance in Kwang Chow Wan.
There is no adequate statement to be found about finance in
Kwang Chow Wan. The local budget for 1914 balanced at 323,000
Piasters or $150,000 which is about equal to the annual expenditure
in Wei Hai Wei.
1. Reine^ch, Colonial. Administration, pp245-246«
2. Statesman's Year Book, 1914, pp 849. The equivalent of a Pias-
ter is about 24d.
3. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, pp 268.
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Railway Concessions In Connection with the Lease
of Kwang Chow Tan.
With the concession of the right to railway construction secured
in the treaty of lease, the French government entrusted the work
to the Socidtie' de Construction des Chemins de Fer Indo Chinosis.
The total length of the line from Laokai to Yunnan is about 287
miles. It opened to traffic in 1910. This line is connected with
the Laokai-Haipheng railway which, consisting of 248 miles, will
connect Yunnanfu with the sea and will possibly make Haipheng the
terminal of South Western China. France conquered Tonking with
the fixed idea of gaining ready commercial and political access to
China throughput Yunnan province. This is why she exerts her best
1
energy in constructing the Tonking Yunnanfu railway. Her engineers
u
have strenously determined to overcome the 1600 meter ascent from
K
the level of the Red River to the Yunnan plateau while her fin-
anciers incurred a total cost of ;:32,216,000 or an average cost
' 2
of something over §60,000 per mile. The fact that the French are
increasing their army in Indo China aroused another great sus-
picions in the mind of the Chinese Foreign Office as to their object
and the Office haft negotiated with the French Minister for a de-
finite agreement that neither China nor France should station troops
along the Yunnan Tonking Railway and that the Chinese section
should be guarded by the Chinese police only. The Office in 1909
wired to the Viceroy of Yunnan to train the soldiers in his pro-
ted
vince in case of emergency. So here again are P-lsi&^the seeds for
future trouble to China over a commercial concession originally
1. Far Eastern Review, 1909, Nov. No., pp 303.
2. Ibid pp 304.
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given up to "cement the ties of friendship"v/ith France.
Some Characteristics in Kwang Chow Wan .
It was Bismark who described the colonial affairs of the three
countries in the epigram, "England has colonies and colonist j;
Germany has colonists hut no colonies; France has colonies but
no colonists." This is the case in Kwang Chow Wan as well as in
Indo China. In spite of the reforms of M. Doumer, which have accom-
plished so much in the direction of improving the administration
of Indo China and Kwang Chow ^an, these places are still sparsely
colonized.

CHAPTER V.
W EI H A I WEI.
..ei Hai ^ei, the English leased territory, which lies in lati-
tude 37.30 N, longtitude 122.10 E . is situated on the North Eastern
coast of the Shangtung peninsula. It comprises the Island of Lui-
kung, all the islands in the Bay of Wei Hai Wei, and a belt of
land ten English miles wide along the entire coast line. The total
area is 285 square miles exclusive of a neutral zone of 1,505
square miles. It was leased to Great Britain by China by a conven-
of 1
tion signed at Peking on the lst^July, 1898.
2
From its geographical position, Mr Denby says, "Wei Hai Wei
3
is an excellent harbor, much larger and better than Fort Arthur.
It is exactly at the mouth of the Gulf of Pefchili, and is the
nearest point on the Gulf to Korea. It commands the Gulf. It is
about 40 miles from Chefoo and 80 miles from Kiao Chow. It is sup-
4
posed here that it will be a second or northern Hong Kong."
Viewed from its strategical importance, Charles Beresford says,
" I consider it an immense acquisition to our naval strength in
the China seas, as with but a comparatively small expenditure of
1. Hertslets, China Treaties, vol.1, p. 122.
2. Presidential Messages and Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1898,
p. 190.
3. This is, however, not yet shown in fact.
4. It is still to be realized.

1money it could be made a most efficient and powerful naval ba3e."
Again, he says, " At this moment there is no place in Chinese water:
2
where battleships can anchor so close to the shore." However, Be-
resford admits that at present ( 1898 ) , Wei Hai Wei is in no way to
be compared in power to fort Arthur.
Commercially, it is an easy place for shipping to make. But as
are
far as railway facilities k concerned, it is unlikely that Wei Hai
Wei can ever become a ^reat mere intile port.
3
The occupation of Wei Hai Wei.
As Great Britain failed to persuade Russia in dropping her de-
lease
mands for the lease of Fort Arthur and Talienwan, and as Russia'sA
of these ports together with Germany's lease of Kiao Chow were
thought to be detrimental to British commercial safety in North
China, she definitely resolved, on March 25, 1898, to demand speedi-
the
ly the lease of 7fei Hai Wei. On April 3, British fleet in Hong
Kong was ordered to proceed to the Gulf of Peichili. It must be
understood that Wei Hai Wei at that time was still in the handSof
the Japanese who occupied it during the Chino- Japanese ar. It was
Japan's ambition if possible to retain her control over it. But
owing to the aggressive policy of the Russians and Germans in the
North China Sea, Japan could not stand it without an alliance. The
a.
fact that Japan did not r
A
ise any objection against the English lease
of Wei Hai Wei was because she had another object in view and that
object was to have a defensive alliance with Great Britain. So the
transfer of the territory went smoothly and was then put under the
1. Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China, p. 71.
2. Ibid, p. 72.
3. J,apan Weekly Mail, 1898,

'""8U
control of the admiralty of Great Britain.
1
Government of Wei Hai Wei.
The administration of Wei Hai Wei was first undertaken by the
Sei. ior Naval Officer on the station in 1898. In the following year
it was transferred to a military and civil commissioner appointed
by the War Office. On the 1st of Fanuary, 1901, the territory was
handed over to the control of the Colomial Office, and a civil
Commissioner assumed the administration of the government in 1902.
The Civil Commissioner is appointed under the King's Sign Manual
and Signet. By the Wei Eai hei Order in Council of the 24th of July,
1901, he is empowered to make ordinances, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of State for the colonies, for the administration
of the territory, and provision is made for a High Court in which
all jurisdiction, civil and criminal, is vested, subject to an
appeal to the supreme Court of Hong Kong, and for District Magis-
trates Courts.
The village communities are administered through their headmen
in accordance with Chinese customs.
2
Treaty Provision .
The treaty regulating the territory of Wei Hai Wei, signed 1st
July, 1898, specified that within the limits (285 sq.miles), Great
Britain has the sole jurisdiction, except that within the walled
city Chinese Officials may exercise such jurisdiction as is not in-
consistent with naval and military requirements for the defense of
the territory leased.
1. Colonial Office List, 1914, pp 401; Directory & Chronicle for
China pp,829.
2. Hertslets'*, China Treaties, vol.1, pp. 122.
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With respect to the 1,505 sq. miles mutual zone, Chinese admin-
istration will not be interfered with, but no troops other than
Chinese or British shall be allov/ed therein.
The first article provides that Great Britain shall lease this
territory for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the
t
obsession of Russia. But though Port Arthur was surrendered to
indicated
the Japanese on January 1st, 1905, Great Britain has not^any in-
tention to withdraw from Wei Hai Wei and an agreement was made be -
tween China and Great Britain whereby the latter is allowed to re-
tain her lease for 25 years from the date of the signing of the
Russian Treaty.
Port Edward.
The chief port of the territory is named Port Edward in commem-
oration of the coronation of King Edward VII. This is a free port.
1
Trade is carried on by junks and steamers. In 1912,632 steamers of
A
524,927 tons entered the port, exclusive of admiralty colliers and
were
government transports; 452 were British and 180 small Japanese and
Chinese coasting boats. It is not destined to be a mere mtile port.
2
Wei Hai Wei as a Naval Base.
Although both Denby and Beresford have spoken highly of Wei Hai
Wei as a naval base yet the station has not been fortified. This
is partly because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which, as was
thought, renders fortification unnecessary and partly because Bri-
tain would not entail the heavy expenditure which the work requires.
1. Stateraan's Year Book, 1914, pp. 180.
2. Ibid A 1914, pp. 179.

It is now used as a flying naval base and as a depot, exercising
ground and sanatorium for the "China Squadron", which consists of
and which
50 ships, ^assembles at Wei Hal Wei during the summer. No troops
are stationed in this territory, the Chinese regiment having
been disbanded. Military work cost Great Britain 130,000 L in
1899. Since then this expenditure has not been made.
A Study of Finance An Wei Hai Wei .
The revenue of Wei Hai Wei is drawn from land tax, road tax,
junk registration, shipping dues, wine monopoly, fines and miscel-
laneous sources. The revenue covers a little more than half of the
expenditure; so the territory is not yet self-supporting. The de-
ficit is madefy grant which is very small as compared v/ith Germany 'b
appropriation in Kiao£how and Japan's appropriation in Kwantnag.
The annual revenue, expenditure, and grant are as follows:
Date Revenue Expenditure Grant
mix.dol
.
mix.dol
.
L
1901-02 11,250
1902-03 12,000
1903-04 58,364 166,921 9,000
1904-05 90,415 162,282 6,000
1905-06 105,934 146,120 3,000
1906-07 76,777 160,973 4,000
1907-08 80,331 173,341 10,000
1908-09 83,277 168,740 10,000
1909-10 83,499 145,687 4,000
1910-11 75,353 145,028 5,000
1911-12 14,673 153,591 6,000
1912-13 79,582 146,147 6,000
1913-14 72,436 8,300
Figures of the years from 1903-13 are drawn from the Colonial
Office List, 1914, p. 401; from 1901-03, are drawn from Statesman's
Year Book, 1906, p. 195 ; from 1913-14, are drawn from Statesman's
Year Book, 1914, p. 179.

Mining and Railway,
Mining and railway enterprise are absent here. The territory
contains gold, and a mining company has been working steadily for
1
two years but has now ceased operation. During the early Ger-
man occupation of Kiao Chow, Great Britain consented by diplomatic
for
agreement with Germany not to ask^any railway concession in the
province of Shangtung in order to avoid complications. This execu-
tive agreement has been observed.
The Importance of Wei Hai Wei to Great Britain.
It is well known that Great Britain has the greatest amount of
trade with China. Before the lease of Wei Hai Wei, the three prin-
cipal ports along the northern coast of China were Chefoo, Tientsin
2
and Newchwang. According to the statistics of 1897, out of a to-
tal tonnage of 4,042,928 which cleared at the three ports, 2,265,
658 tons were of British ships. The total trade of the three ports
3
in 1897 was 103,469,664 hk.tls., more than half of which was con-
ducted by the British. British trade with Manchuria alone was then
over 3,000,000 -t. The distribution of tonnage entered and cleared
4
at the three ports in the Gulf of Peichili in 1897 was as follows:
Ports Total tonnage of shipping British tonnage
entered and cleared entered and cleared
Chefoo 2,385,301 1,327,559
Newchwang 730,964 363,922
Tientsin 1,326,663 574,177
Total 4,042,925 2,265,658"
1. Statesman's Year Book, 1906, p. 195.
2. Commercial Relations of the U. S.,, 1898 and 1899, vol. 1,
under Chefoo, Newchwang and Tientsin.
3. The approximate American equivalent of hk.tls. in 1897 is
.75.
4. Charles Beresford, The B reak up of China, Appendex, p. 484.

Such was the British trade in the Gulf of Peichili in 1897, a
few months before the occupation of Wei Hai .-'ei. 7/ithout naval
station in the same water, British commerce would be at the
mercy of Russia and of Germany. Wei Hai 7/ei is important to Gr^at
Britain because it is thought to be the only safeguard for her
commerce in northern China.
The Future of Wei Hai Wei.
Great Britain justified her lease of this territory for the
protection of commerce against the Russian lease of Kwantung and
the German lease of Kiao Chow. Nov/ both Kwantung and Kiao Chow
have successively fallen into the hand of Japan which is in al-
vith
liance y\ Great Britain. Great Britain has abandoned her plan of
the fortification of Wei Hai Wei because she thinks that the Anglo-
Japanese a liance will render such a plan unnecessary. In theory,
such a situation seems to be true; it seems that after Japan has
got hold of Kwantung and Kiao Chow, Great Britain will no longer
be in need of Wei Hai Wei. According to such a point of wiew, it
will naturally follow that Great Britain will restore it to China
as soon as the leased term expires. But ife this the real situation;
Have Great Britain's enemies in the China Sea disappeared with
the fall of Kwamtung and the fall of Kiao Chow ? Is the Japanese
alliance real and permanent ? The destiny of Wei Hai Wei will de-
pend to a large extent on these questions.
In every respect, Japan bears similarity with Great Britain.
Both Japan and Great Britain are island countries. Both Japan and
Great Britain are naval powers. Both Japan and Great Britain are
manufacturing countries. Both countries have the same demands,
same supplies, same ambitions, and same objects of contention. Their
in
r
blending together into an Reliance is only a matter of temporary
convenience. Without going into th< situation too deeply, let
us review their struggle forcommercial supremacy in China.
In 1909 British cotton goods trade with China coveredjten-s ix-
teenthsof China's total importation of cotton goods
,
but decreased
a great deal in 1910 and 1912. In spite of a little increase
in the amount of this trade in 1911 its ratio to China's total
importation of cotton good;.; in 1913 was nine to sixteen. During
the same period, Japam's export of cotton goods to China has in-
creased from the ratio of one to sixteen; to five to sixteen in
1913. Owing to the cheap labor in Japan and the shorter distance
between Japan and China, Japan's advantage over Great Britain will
become more marked as time goes on. TMs cotton goods trade is
only typical; commercial competitinn between Japan and Great Britain
is found in nearly every branch of trade. Mr Weale says, "After
having won the Russian war largely through Anglo-American moral
support and Anglo-American gold, Japan intends to make profit and
take payment, not from Russia, which remained unbeaten, but from
the neutral world of Eastern Asia. In this contest Japan will be the
decisive factor along the vast Far Eastern coast lines, unless there
2
is a naval combination of all Anglo-Saxondom. " Many English people
1. Under the name of cotton goods, the writer only includes shift
ings, sheetings, drills, jeans & T-cloths .
The cotton goods trade of Japan & Great Britain is as follows:
Date Great Britain Japan
pieces pieces
1909 10,691,448 1,396,297
1910 6,511,126 2,389,693
1911 11,317,630 2,832,625
1912 9,618,386 3,043,747
1913 11,705,426 5,716,594
2. Weale, The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia, pp.519.
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have expressed such an Opinion. At any rate, even those who have
not gone so far as to show distrust in Japan, have doubt neverthe-
less in the so-called Anglo- Japanese alliance which long ago lost
English
the support or oublic opinion. Great Britain leased Wei Hai ^ei to
counterbalance the influence of Russia and Germany. She is glad to
see that both Russia and Germany have lost their influence in the
Gulf of Pei shili^ but , contrary to her expectation , she has found
a subtler competitor instead. It is not improbable that
Wei Hai Wei will play a prominent part in the future Anglo- Japanese
relations
•
So far as the trade in the North China Sea is concerned accord-
ing to the statistics of 1912 and 1911, Great Britain still controls
11,000,000 «fc of trade in Tien Tsin, Chefoo, Kiao Chow, and Niu-
Chuang, or about 40% of the total trade of the four ports. Tientsin
in 1911 had a foreign net import of 7,098,782 * out of which
1
1,108,164 were British. Niu Chuang in 1912, had a total import of
2
1,280,721 b out of which 453,518 L came from Britain. KiaoChow in
1911 had a total trade of 6,995,866 L, of which more than 60% of
3
the cargo for Europe went i i British bottoms. Chefoo in 1912, had
a total import of 672,353 L of which, 276,615 L was of British ori-
4
gin. In a word, British trade in North China is still surpassed by
5
none, and the safety of her trade in such places will depend to a
large extent on Wei Hai WTei. This very fact will control the des-
tiny of Wei Hai Wei at least for some years to come.
1. House of Commons Sessional Paper£ 1912-13, vol. 94, No .4902
2. Ibid 4901
3. Ibid vol, 95, " 4935
4. Ibid ,1913 " 5071
5. An exception is found in Dalny (Dairen) where according to
1912, British imports (including HongKong) represents only 6%
while the Japanese imports into the said port i>s^ as high as 7lk%
U i.

CHAPTER VI
K W LOON.
KowlOon, another English leased territory, is situated around
the ceded territory, Hong Kong. The extent of this territory is
about 366 square miles, namely 286 sq. miles on the mainland and 90
1
sq. miles on the islands. It comprises the territory behind Kowloon
peninsula up to a line drawn from Mirs Bay to Deep Bay and the adja -
cent islands, including Lautao. It was leased to Great Britain on
2
9th June, 1898.
This territory is both important in itself and in its relation
to Hong Kong. As to the value of itself, the Mirs Bay, the Deep Bay
the Castle Peak Bay and the Tolo Bay are good naval baee^. The rail-
way which passes through the mainland renders it a means of communi-
cation. With respect to its relation with Hong Kong, it furnishes
type of
the same protection to Hong Kong^that^the skull does to the brain.
It is Hong Kong's back ground; it is Hong Kong's safeguard. In or-
der to have a clear understanding of the importance of Kowloon, we
must first have a real idea of how important Hong Kong is.
In speaking of the geographical situation of Hong Kong, one of
1. Directory and Chronicle for China, 1914, P. 1108.
2. Herslets China Treaties, vol.1, P. 120.
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the resolutions of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce de-
clares that Hong Kong, "lying half-way between India and Japan, on
the very borders of one of the most populous provinces of China,
and at the mouth of one of the greatest systems of inland naviga-
tion in Asia, is of supreme importance to British trade."
With respect to commerce, the same Chamber says, "the trade of
Hong Kong, now (1898) roughly estimated at|some fifty millions ster-
ling per annum, may, when the river ways of South China are opened
and the railway to the Yangtze Valley becomes an accomplished fact,
ng
reasonably be expected to expand immensely." Taki Athe world ship-
ping for comparison, Hong Kong today ranks as one of the greatest
1
shipping centers in the world. The exact figures are:
New York (1912)
Antwerp (1911)
Hong Kong (1912)
Hamburg (1911)
Rotterdam (1911)
Shanghai (1911)
London (1911)
Tonnage entered and cleared
13,673,763 tons
13,330,699
12,100,365
11,830,949
11,052,186
9,429,996
9,004,974
2
According to the statistics of 1913, British imports from Hong
Kong amount to 676,293 -t, while her exports to Hong Kong mount as
high as 4,3^8,902 t. This constitues half of the total trade in
Hong Kong,
Such has been the commercial condition of. Hong Kong. The Chamber
of Commerce at Hong Kong is not far from right when it declares,
1. Statistical Abstract, 1912, P. 815.
2. Statefrian's Year Book, 1914, P. 118.
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"However important the trade of the United Kingdom with central
China, it must no t be forgotten that the key to British influence
and prestige in the Far East reposes in the colony of Hong Kong."
In regard to the sphere of influence, Hong Kong also furnishes
a good starting point. The second resolution of the Hong Kong Gen-
the situation
eral Chamber of Commerce summarizesAas follows:
"Hong Kong through a line of railway, connecting first with Can-
ton, and eventually with Hankow and her sister cities Wuchang and
Hanyang, is in a position to directly tap the very heart of com-
mercial China."
It is the situation of Hong Kong that makes Kowloon important;
it is the situation of Hong Kong that led Britain to lease Kowloon
instead of some other place.
Government
.
This new territory is administered by means of village communi-
ties organized and under the direct control of the government of
1
Hong Kong. The headquarters of the administration are at Taipohu
on an arm of Mirs Bay. A District Officer, who performs police and
magistrial duties, resides there. The southern district is in charge
* 2
ofi an assistant District Officer. In the treaty, a stipulation was
included that within the walled city of Kowloon the Chinese offi-
1. The administration of Hong Kgng is in the hands of a governor,
aided by an Executive Council, composed of 6 official and 2 non-
official members, besides the governor. The legislative council is
presided over by the governor, and is composed of 7 officials and
6 non-official members, three of whom are nominated by the Crown on
the recommendation of the Governor, (two being usually Chinesejf,
one is nominated by the Justices of the Peace from their body and
one by the Chamber of Commerce. The English Common Law forms the
basis of the legal system, modified by Colonial Ordinances. See
Colonial Office List, 1914, P. 211.
2. Hertslet's China Treaties, vol.1, P. 120.

cials then stationed there should continue to exercise Jurisdiction
except so far as might be inconsistent with the military require-
ments for the defense of Hong Kong, but in 1699 the Chinese offi-
cials ceased to exercise jurisdiction within Kowloon city, which
thereafter, by an Order in Council, was incorporated in the
1
leased territory and became subject to British rule,
2
Treaty Provlsion
s_^
The convention between China and Great Britain respecting the
lease of Kowloon, signed at Peking 9th June, 1898, is similar to
the Wei Hai Wei treaty except in tv/o respects. In the first place,
the term of the lease of Kowloon is ninety-nine years instead of
the
twenty-five years as . is case of Wei Hai Wei. In the second place,
A
we notice that there is a provision regarding railway construction
in the Kowloon treaty, which is absent in that of Wei Hai Wei. It
stipulates thaf'when hereafter China constructs a railway to the
boundary of the Kowloon territory under British control, arrange-
ments shall be discussed." This provision is exceedingly significant
because through its application, the commercial value of Hong Kong
has been safeguarded. The relation between the Kowloon Canton Rail-
way will command our immediate attention.
The Kowloon Canton Railway .
for
Why was the provisionAof this railway inserted in the Kowloon
Convention? In 1897 when the Canton-Hankow section of the trunk
line to Peking was projected and a concession granted the American-
China Development Company, it was proposed to construct a deep water
1. Colonial Office List, 1914, P. 208.
2. Herslets, China Treaties, P. 120.

harbor in the Chinese territory near Canton, the terminus. Hong Kong
at once realised that if such a port were established and no effort
made to secure the benefits of railway connection with trunk line,
her existence as a distributing centre for south China would be
1
threatened. So great effort has been directed by British merchants
and statesman in securing the concession to build the line connect
ing Kowloon and Canton which, when completed, would provide the
needed railway com cction with the trunk line and thus preserve
to Hong Kong at least her share of the trade even should the deep
water harbor contemplated at Canton be realised. After securing
the concession, the British and Chinese corporation was organized
and after some delay, finally in 1905, the corporation secured a
loan of L 1,500,000 from the Hong Kong Government and started its
work. The line is in two sections. The first section between
Canton and Shunchun (under the Chinese control, but financed by
the British Government )/ consisting of 89| miles ; is on Chinese terri
tory. The section between Shunchun and Kowloon consisting of 22-J
miles is on the leased territory. This line, after the Canton Han-
kow railway (700 m.) has been completed, will not only have more
immediate communication with the Yangtze Valley and Peking but will
also furnish a serious check on the growth of Canton.
1. The Far Eastern Review, 1909, Nov. bio., P. 335

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS.
In the preceding chapters, the writer has attempted to give
the actual facts concerning the territories leased by China to
foreign powers. It now remains to compare the five leased terri-
tories, to discuss the legal effects of the leases upon Chinese
sovereignty over the territories, and to present some general
conclusions respecting the very intricate problems involved in
this unique international situation*
Comparison of the Five Territories .
In regard to the area of the leased territories proper, Kwan-
tung stands first with an area of 1256 square miles; next in or-
der,. follow Kowloon with an area of 366 square miles, Wei Hai Wei
with
'
285 square miles, Kiao Chow, with 193 square miles, and finally
Kwang Chow Wan, with 190 square miles. Considered from the stand
point of present possessors, Japan controls the largest area,Kwan
tung and Kiao Chow with a total area of 1,449 square miles; Great
Britain coming next has Wei Hai Wei and Kowloon with a total area
of 651 square miles, and France coming last hold? Kwan Chow Wan,
190 square miles.
-<ith respect to the neutral zone, definite data is not obtain-
able for Kwantung. Both Kowloon and Kwan Chow Wan are devoid of
neutral zones. Attaching to Kiao Chow, there is a neutral zone

of 2,700 square miles and to Wei Hal Wei, one of 1,505 square
miles
•
In regard to population, the only place where the displacement
of the Chinese by the lessee is felt is Kwantung. This may soon
happen in Kiao Chow. There is nothing of this sort to be seen in
Kwan Chow Wan, Kowloom, or Wei Hai Wei.
So far as method of acquisition is concerned, after Germany
6^ Ci 3.n cihad started the occupation of Kiao Chow, all follow one another
A \
based their claims on the future protection of their own interests
and
Germany s motive^ppearance as well as her action in acquiring
Kiao Chow had been very open; every man knew her plan. Russia and
France worked together; their words were sweet but their motives
and actions, otherwise. However, men might still be able to tell
their aims from their actions. There remained Great Britain whose
words and actions all appeared to be courteous. An average man
finds it very hard to tell whether Great Britain was true to the
professions she made. At first she sided with ^hina to protest
Russia's action but she changed her course, joined in the spolia-
tion and at last got two leases which were in total area greater
than any other territory except that gotten by the Russians. It
was
might be claimea that Great Britain justified in leasing Wei Hai
A
north
Wei because it was necessary for her to protect her trade in Chi-
A
na against the Russians . But for what purpose was she persist-
ing in demanding the lease of Kowloon ? Some one says," The lease
of Kowloon was for the protection of Hong Kong." But against
whon was the protection sought ? Great Britain leased Wei Hai
Wei for so long a period as Kussia should retain her control over
Kwantung. Why then should she like to retain Wei Hai Wei in spite
of Russia's loss of Kwantung ? With the recent Japanese demand
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for the extension of the lease of Kwantung to 99 years, will Great
Britain herself take a similar step in regard to Wei Hai
Wei ? If Great Britain was sincere in her profession respecting
the welfare of China, some concrete action to that end will be ac-
.
u
ceptable. Finally Japan's acqisition of Kwantung from Russia and
h
Kiao Chow from Germany were prompted by her long cherished delu-
sion of Continentalism; of course shr hoped to justify her action
by saying that such measures guaranteed the peace of the Far East.
In considering the comparative commercial importance of these
territories, Kowloon is prominent as the protector of Hong Kong,
one or the world's greatest shipping centers. Dairen stands fore-
most in the rate of commercial growth. Kiao Chow is still the
greatest among the leased territories in the amount of trade. Nei-
ther Wei Hai Wei nor Kwan Chow Wan have yet shown great commercial
value
•
Viewed from their naval value, Port Arthur in Kwantung is still
the pioneer and surpassed by none in uhinese waters, Kiao Chow
must be regarded as next in importance for naval operation? To the
writer's mind, the natural position of Kowloon is far superior to
any of the above mentioned. This is but a personal opinion and
it has by no means been proved by facts. Wei Hai Wei occupies a
good position but it has not been fortified. Kwang Chow Wan is
generally recognized as the least valuable naval base so far as
the leased territories are concerned.
Finally let us compare briefly the sphere of influence which
each of the nations has planned to create in connection with these
territories. In the creation of spheres .f influebce, railways are
to be regarded as the chief agency. So a comparison of the rail-
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way system of each of them will give us bo;Ja^ general and ade finite
idea of the situation. In this discussion, we must exclude wei
Hai Wei which has been incapable of developing a sphere of Influ-
ence on account of the Anglo-German agreement. In connection with
Kowloon, there is a railway line of 89 miles between Canton and t
Kowloon frontier financed and managed by the English capitalists,
and engineers. Although this line is essential to the existence
of Hong Kong yet as an agency for forming a sphere of influence, it
is not very marked because the control is still in the handS >f the
Chinese gonernment. A greater agency is found in the French line
( 248miles ), between Laokai and lunnanfu in connection with the
A
lease of Kwan Chow Wan. It is not until we come to Kiao Chow
that we find something definite. The 310 miles of railway had
been financed, controfed and managed by the Germans. Some definite
German influence had been created along the railway lines. The
sphere of influence remains in spite of the Japanese capture be-
cause Japan, as a victor, claims to inherit all rights and privi-
leges which the Germans have enjoyed. The situation here has been
well worked out but it is still in a milder stage. For the most
conspicuous and most highly developed example we must turn to
the sphere of influence in connection with Kwantung. Here the Ja-
panese control a network of railways with a total trackage of 710
miles. The privilege of guarding the railway further strengthens
her grip.
Legal Effects on the Sovereignty of China .
In spite of all differences between these leased territories,
there are some fundamental similarities in the conditions under
which all of them are leased. They are all leased by treaties
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between the lessor and the lessee. This Is even true in the case
of transfer. They are all leased for a definite period of time. In
Is the
all cases, China abstains from exerting ^rights of administration
tlae
during the term of Alease. In all cases, China's men-of-war still
have the right of station but they depend on the good will of the
lessee. In all cases, the lessee has been given the right to build
barracks and fortifications. Except ».ei Hai Wei, all of them give
some chance or other for the development of spheres of influence
and interest. . Such are the general conditions under which the
leases are made. What then are the legal effects u on the sove-
reignty of China over these territories?
In private law, the lease implies that property continues to be-
long to the lessor, while the lessee has the beneficial enjoyment
under
of it for the time and. the conditions fixed in the contract. SoA
when property is granted in this manner, the original grantor re-
tains a propriela ry right which runs concurrently with the grantees
right of enjoyment. " Even when the lease is in perpetuity, that
is an emphytei1 jis, the emperor Zeno decided that the lessor remains
the dominus. Are we then to say that China still is sovereign
over Kwantung, Kiao Chow, wei Hai Wei, Kowloon and Kwan Chow Wan,
though Japan, Great Britain, and France exeriise, during the term
of lease, important rights in them ? In answering this question
we must first distinguish de jure sovereignty from de facto sove-
reignty.
From the de jure poifct of view, China exercises sovereignty
after,,
over these territories not only A the expiration of the leases
but also during the life of the leases. So with the Japanese cap-
ture of Kwantung and the ending of the Ruasian lease, China's con-
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sent was secured before the transfer had any legal force. And
that consent was the evidence of China's sovereignty over it. The
same thing is fonnd in the recent transfer of Kiao Chow. Legally
speaking China's grant of rights of administration to the lessee
is nothing but^Jele :ation of powers, and the treaty of lease is on-
ly a matter of self limitation. Prom the standpoint of interna-
tional law China is entitled to all rights pertaining to an owner
of these territories on the conditions which she herself has set.
But owing to the relative weakness of China this sovereignty
only exists in a vague manner. As we come to the practical aspect,
note
we^that her de facto sovereignty has been impaired. For example,
the
all the lessees have acquired j^iower of an unrestricted use of the
soil for the erection of barracks, fortresses and other purposes
as well warlike as pacific. Under such condition^ what then will
be the relation between other powers and China with respect to
their belligerent rights if they should be at war with Chin? or
with the lessee ? If China were at war with other powers while
the lessee remains as neutral, can the leased territory be regard-
ed as a part of belligerent zone ? If one lessee were at war with
other powers while China remains neutral, Qan the leased terri-
tory be regarded as a part of the neutral zone ? In theory they
ought to be but in practice they are otherwise. The last case has
out
been tried both in the Russo-Japanese War and the Germano- Japanese
War. Both of these occasions show conclusively that for all pur-
poses of war and neutrality, leased territories" formed a part of
the domain of the lessee. In both cases either China's neutrality
had been lost if she had de facto sovereignty over her leased ter-
ritories or her de facto sovereignty had been impaired if her neu-
trality was regarded as unviolated. We may agree with Lawrence

98
that in fact, the attempt to separate property or sovereignty on
the one hand from possession on the other, ,by the U3e of phrases
in
taken from the law of lease or usufruct, is^its very nature decei -
tive. What China has really leased out is not only the territories
but also the sovereignty thereover.
Final Solution of the Leased Territories.
What than is the final solution of the five leased territories?
What shall the Chinese, the owners, do with the leases over which
they are still supposed to have nominal proprietorship ? Shall
the Chinese finally waive their right over these territories as
Sweden did over Wismar ? Or shall they finally grant their leases
in perpetuity as Zanzibar did in her dominion ? Or shall the Chi-
nese demand their restoration when the leases expire ?
Attention is once more called to the fact that these territories
are important front gates of China, China's gates must be kept
by the Chinese. It is a great national crime for one nation to
encroach upon another nation but it Is a still greater national
crime if a nation exposes itself as an international prey;
such a nation not only endanger?, its own existence but also fur-
nishes an incentive for international conflicts • Aliens, as gate-
keepers for China, expose her to the avarice and ambition of ag-
gressive and predatory peoples and therefore constitute a menace
both to China and to the general peace and welfare of the world.
For China and for the World, the Chinese have the supreme duty and
mission of working toward the restoration of the territories they
have leased. Restoration or downfall are the only alternatives
o
the Chinese have to chose.
A
Restoration depends on unity of purpose, thought, and action
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for its realization. To determine the possibility of future suc-
cess we must first read the past. Many centuries ago, China built
her " Great Wall ", a wall which stretches from the farthest east-
ern ooast to the farthest western boundary of China Proper, a wall
which still stands and will ever stand with veritable pride, and
a wall which defended her territory and people for generations.
This reminds China of the possibility of building a " New Great
Wall " to meet a new crisis. This " New Great Wall " will no long-
er be built with stone and brick, but will be built with four hun-
united
dred million living bodies and souls^in one purpose. Such a " New
Great Wall " is essential to the restoration of old territories;
such a " New Great Wall " is essential to the protection of New
China; such a " New Great Wall " is essential to the prevention of
international conflicts and the preservation of international peace
in the Far East.
However, the restoration of the leased territories must not in-
volve an anti-foreign movement. China must show herself broad-
minded, unprejudiced and friendly toward all nations, seeking noth-
ing but her own national integrity and the preservation of peace.
China must recognize an obligation to humanity as well as to her-
self. Her national aims and policies will ultimately justify them-
selves only as they conserve the interests of mankind in general
as well as China in particular.
In a word, Chinese territory and Chinese sovereignty should
be maintained intact, and it lies with the present generation to
recover the leased territories and restore Chinese sovereignty
therein. Neutral nations should help to bring about this restora-
tion because only by this act can the peace of the Far East be
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guaranteed, . and the " Open Door Policy " be made effective. In-
terested nat ons should restore these territories to China because
only by this act they can avoid conflict both with China and with
one another. China must see to it and the world must understand
that China has millions of square miles open for intercommunica-
tion but not one inch for occupation. Both must recognize that
China's doors are to be widely open to welcome religion, art, scien-
ce, and commerce but not a single door is to be opened for foreign
political domination.
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